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L INTRODUCTION
To those who approach the subject from the vantage supplied
by the standard insurance texts,1 Nebraska's statutory treatment
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1. I have in mind the two single-volume texts most often consulted by students
suffering their first extended exposure to insurance law: PR KEETON, BAsic
TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 6.5 (1971); E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSUR-
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of insurer defenses alleging breaches of policy conditions must ap-
pear inexplicably aberrant. In many states, the traditional com-
mon law rule reigns undisturbed; if the insured fails to satisfy an
express policy condition, the insurer has no duty to perform.2 In
most other states, this strict common law standard has been ame-
liorated by "warranty" statutes that make certain failure of condi-
tion defenses available only if the failure materially increased the
risk that an insured event would occur.3 In Nebraska, however, the
legislative reform went even further. Section 44-358 of the Ne-
braska Revised Statutes prescribes a "contribute to the loss"
standard:
The breach of a warranty or condition in any contract or policy of insur-
ance shall not avoid the policy nor avail the insurer to avoid liability, un-
less such breach shall exist at the time of the loss and contribute to the
loss, anything in the policy or contract of insurance to the contrary
notwithstanding.4
Several other states employ a contribute to the loss standard for
very restricted classes of defenses.5 Nebraska alone prescribes the
standard for all lines of insurance.
A homely example will demonstrate both the significance of
those differences in approach and the concerns that prompted the
statutory initiatives. Consider that common feature of the Family
ANCE LAw § 72 (2d ed. 1957). As indicated in note 19 and accompanying text,
infra, most other familiar insurance references provide little warning of the
distinctive Nebraska statutory provision discussed in this Article.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(1) (1981): "Performance of a
duty subject to a condition cannot become due unless the condition occurs or
its non-occurrence is excused."
3. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAw § 150(2) (McKinney 1966): "No breach of warranty
shall avoid an insurance contract or defeat recovery thereunder unless such
breach materially increased the risk of loss, damage or injury within the cov-
erage of the contract."
4. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-358 (Reissue 1978). This provision was first enacted in
1913 as part of an extensive revision of insurance statutes, Act of 1913, ch. 154,
§ 51, 1913 Neb. Laws 419. It has never been amended.
5. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 515.101-.102 (West 1949) (applicable to some non-life in-
surance policy provisions purporting to make "the policy void before loss oc-
curs"); KAN. STAT. § 40-418 (1973) (applicable to misrepresentations in life
insurance applications); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 500.2836 (Supp. 1981) (ap-
plicable to pre-loss breaches of fire insurance policy warranties or condi-
tions); Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.580 (1978) (applicable to misrepresentations in
life insurance applications); R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-4-10 (1979) (applicable to
misrepresentations in life insurance applications); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art.
6.14 (Vernon 1981) (applicable to breaches of provisions of fire insurance poli-
cies covering personal property). For many years New Hampshire pre-
scribed a contribute to the loss standard for "mistake" and
"misrepresentation" defenses to claims on fire insurance policies, but that
statute was repealed in 1959. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 407:4 (1955) (repealed,
1959 N.H. Laws 171).
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Combination Automobile Policy, the provision on the declarations
page that "[t]he owned automobile will be principally garaged in
the town or city designated" 6 as part of the address of the named
insured. If the provision is violated,7 as where the insured car ac-
companies the college-bound daughter for a four-year sojourn
amidst the groves of academe, the jurisdiction's choice of standard
may determine whether the insurer will be obligated to indemnify
for losses otherwise within the policy coverage.
The common law rule permits no inquiry into whether the new
location of the car in any way prejudiced the insurer; the garaging
provision is a "warranty," and warranty conditions must be strictly
satisfied.8 Thus, unless the common law has been modified by
statute, it would not avail the insured to demonstrate that the car
was moved from a congested, high-rate environment to a pastoral
location where the insurer perceives the risk to be less, nor does it
6. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, SAMPLE INSURANCE POLICIES, PROPERTY
LIABILITY COVERAGES 18.
7. Sometimes courts stretch to conclude that the provision was not violated by
construing the provision as an "affirmative" warranty, relating only to facts
existing at the time of contracting. See, e.g., Karp v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins.
Co., 134 Pa. Super. 514, 4 A.2d 529 (1939). Sometimes, too, the characterization
of the provision as a "declaration" leads to speculation that it might be
treated as a representation. See, e.g., R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 404. Usu-
ally, however, the provision is viewed as a traditional warranty which must
be satisfied as a condition precedent to the insurer's liability. See, e.g., E.
PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 290, 297-99, 404.
8. See, e.g., Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 533, 544 (1840):
The general rule in regard to what constitutes a warranty, in a
contract of insurance, is well settled. Any statement or description,
or any undertaking on the part of the insured, on the face of the pol-
icy, which relates to the risk, is a warranty. Whether this is declared
to be a warranty totidem verbis, or is ascertained to be such, by con-
struction, is immaterial. In either case, it is an express warranty, and
a condition precedent. If a house be insured against fire, and is de-
scribed in the policy as being "copper roofed," it is as express a war-
ranty, as if the language had been, "warranted to be copper roofed;"
and its truth is as essential to the obligation of the policy, in one case
as in the other. In either case, it must be strictly observed. There
may often be much difficulty in ascertaining from the construction of
the policy, whether a fact, quality or circumstance specified, relates
to the risk, or is inserted for some other purpose-as to shew the
identity of the article insured, &c. This must be settled, before the
rule can be applied. But when it is once ascertained, that it relates to
the risk, and was inserted in reference to that, it must be strictly ob-
served and kept, or the insurance is void.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 (1981). Continued ad-
herence to the strict rule has been roundly criticized, perhaps with greatest
force in Childres, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 45 N.Y.U. L REv. 33
(1970). A similar attack on the position of the second Restatement is
mounted in Childres & Sales, Restatement (Second) and the Law of Condi-
tions in Contracts, 44 Miss. LJ. 591 (1973).
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matter how the loss occurred. Any unexcused failure of condition
supports a determination of no liability.
The "materiality" standard, by contrast, allows an insurer a de-
fense only if it can demonstrate that the failure of condition mate-
rially enhanced the risk that an insured event would occur.9 Under
this standard, it becomes important whether the car was moved
from a low-risk area to a high-risk area, or the converse.1 0 How-
ever, the actual cause of loss remains of no consequence. If, for
example, the move materially exacerbated traffic-related risks but
did not increase the risk of hail damage, the insurer will be permit-
ted a failure of condition defense whether the car was damaged in
a rush-hour fender-bender, lost its glass in a hailstorm, or had its
hood bashed in by the too-precipitous closing of an automatic ga-
rage door.
A contribute to the loss standard goes one step further. It re-
quires the insurer to shoulder the burden of demonstrating not
only that the risk of loss from some potential cause was enhanced
by the change in garaging arrangements, but also that one of those
9. CAL. INS. CODE § 334 (West 1972) puts the requirement most plainly: "Materi-
ality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and
reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication
is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract,
or in making his inquires." Most judicial formulations maintain this focus,
though they sometimes frame the question in terms of the effect of the true
facts on a hypothetical prudent insurer rather than the particular insurer in-
volved in the litigation. See generally E. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 408-28;
W. YOUNG, CASES & MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 143-46 (1971). Dis-
cussions of materiality often are influenced by the fact that materiality most
frequently is made an issue by the effort of an insurer to assert a misrepre-
sentation or concealment defense. However, where a statute makes the ma-
teriality standard applicable to a failure of policy condition defense, the
inquiry is not changed. See, e.g., Irv-Bob Formal Wear, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Mut. Ins. Co., 81 Misc. 2d 422, 366 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Civ. Ct 1975), a'd, 86 Misc. 2d
1006, 383 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding that failure to satisfy policy
condition requiring maintenance of inspection records did not provide a
breach of warranty defense under the New York statute).
[W]hether or not any records were made and maintained, no evi-
dence was introduced to show that the absence of such records "ma-
terially increased the risk of loss." Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
how the presence or absence of records in and of themselves could
have "materially increased the risk of loss." Inspecting the alarm
system and keeping it in working order would be important with re-
spect to the risk of loss .... [However], [i]t would appear that any
failure to keep a record of inspections was just the kind of '"mmate-
rial 'breach of warranty" which the Legislature had in mind in en-
acting section 150.
81 Misc. 2d at 428,366 N.Y.S.2d at 603 (quoting N.Y. INs. LAw § 150(2) (McKin-
ney 1966) and Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 291 N.Y. 45, 51, 50 N.E.2d
538, 540 (1943)).
10. R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 403-04.
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increased risks actually came to fruition in the damage suffered by
the car. Under this standard, proof that the car's new location ma-
terially increased the risk of traffic-related damages does not help
the insurer if the loss was caused by hailstones which were no
more likely in the new location than the old.
To Professor Patterson, the contribute to the loss standard was
"the most radical innovation in insurance law."" It was also, he
thought, simply and radically wrong. Although he judiciously re-
fused to ascribe its scattered manifestations to "the blind
prejudice of untutored legislators"' 2-after all, as Keeton would
later point out, "the strongest showing of materiality is proof that
the breach contributed to the loss"' 3 -he brooked no doubt that it
was error. To Patterson, and the critics who have followed his
lead, the contribute to the loss standard's commendable solicitude
for insureds is outweighed by a long list of objections. To require
an insurer to show a causal nexus between a failure of condition
and the loss suffered is said to generate wasteful litigation,14 to
subject the insurer to the vagaries of jury decisions,15 to impede
the insurer's ability to tailor insurance coverage to specific market-
ing needs,16 and unfairly to penalize other insureds who do not ma-
terialy fail to satisfy policy conditions.' 7 Fortunately, Patterson
11. E. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 353. Keeton calls contribute to the loss stat-
utes "among the most extreme of regulatory measures in the extent to which
they protect policyholders from the consequences of violating policy stipula-
tions." R. KEETON, s-upra note 1, at 384.
12. E. PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 355.
13. I. KEETON, supra note 1, at 382.
14. Id. at 383.
15. E. PATrEPsON, supra note 1, at 357-58.
16. IL KEnTON, supra note 1, at 383.
17. This, the most telling of the criticisms, deserves careful elaboration; as Pat-
terson noted, the arguments sometimes adduced do little to further the
debate:
To condemn these laws by pointing out the unquestioned fact that
the insurer in Iowa is legally bound to pay claims that he would not
be bound to pay in New York is question begging, since it assumes
that the New York law is the only sbund scheme of risk distribution.
On the other hand, to justify the Iowa statute by saying that the in-
surance companies-can increase their rates to meet the added liabili-
ties is also unsound, for the argument leaves untouched the question
whether the insureds who do not breach any of the conditions of
their contracts should be called upon to pay additional premiums to
satisfy additional claims made collectible by reason of the statute.
E. PAERSON, supra note 1, at 356. Patterson has provided a helpful discus-
sion of the rate-equity implications of a contribute to the loss approach. Id. at
356-57. Keeton has presented the issue even more plainly:
First, a contribute-to-loss standard of materiality tends to produce
an inequity in rate structure. Insurers will sometimes lack proof that
a violation contributed to a loss, even when it in fact did so. From the
insurer's point of view, because of this juridical risk it is more expen-
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
opined, because it was confined chiefly to a few pockets of mid-
western error, the contribute to the loss standard could be dis-
missed as of only "theoretical importance."' 8
So much for the view from the East Coast. Those who observe
the Nebraska insurance scene from less lofty aeries likely will
sive to service the contracts of those policyholders who engage in
policy violations than to service the contracts of those who conform;
the risk that the company undertakes for those who commit policy
violations is somewhat higher than the risk it undertakes for others.
Despite this, the same premiums are paid by the two groups. Of
course one might argue that this discrimination is justified on the
same basis as any other rate classification that is broad enough to
include some persons whose risks are greater than others within the
same classification. Also, similar inequities probably arise from ju-
ridical risks under any standard of liability. For example, if the deci-
sive question is merely whether a violation of policy terms has
occurred, the nonviolators help to pay for the losses of those violators
whose violations cannot be proved. The effect of the juridical risks
on equity of the rate structure is undoubtedly greater, however,
under a contribute-to-loss statute than under an increase-of-risk stat-
ute. In cases of fire loss, for example, the evidence needed to prove
that a violation contributed to the loss will often be destroyed by the
fire. In any event it is so much more difficult to prove contribution to
loss than increase of risk that a much higher percentage of cases will
be decided by lack of adequate evidence if the former is the decisive
issue.
R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 382 (footnote omitted).
18. E. PATtERSON, supra note 1, at 351.
It is worth noting that the issues raised by contribute to the loss statutes
have significance even in jurisdictions that have not adopted that statutory
formula. Insurance policies are full of provisions that make insurer liability
turn on whether a particular risk factor in fact caused an insured event to
occur. Usually, of course, such provisions are there because insurers have
chosen to put them there; the insurer is willing to subject itself and its policy-
holders to the juridical risks associated with determining whether property
damage to an automobile was "caused by collision" where the insured
purchased one but not both of the "collision" and "comprehensive" coverages
marketed by the insurer. Sometimes, however, such provisions are in the
policy because effectively mandated by statute. For example, in some juris-
dictions life insurers are generally prohibited from conditioning liability
upon the occurrence of death in a particular manner or while the insured has
a specified status, but insurers may employ provisions drawn from a short
statutory laundry list of actual cause provisions. Thus, in such jurisdictions,
it would be permissible for an insurer to except liability for death "resulting
from service in the military," but it would not be permissible for the insurer
to include a suspensive condition preventing liability if death occurs "while
in the military." See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 410 (1979). See generally
W. MEYER, LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE LAw §§ 7.1-7.15 (1972).
Another related phenomenon is the occasional judicial decision that re-
fuses, without statutory warrant, to enforce a policy condition as written be-
cause the failure to satisfy the condition did not contribute to the loss. See,
e.g., Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Mont.
1981); Avemco Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142 (D. Hawaii 1975); South
Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 269 S.C. 282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1977).
[Vol. 61:209
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form quite different impressions. In fact, a lawyer who seeks to
gain his bearings from the insurance or more generalized encyclo-
pedias might be forgiven for missing the contribute to the loss stat-
ute entirely; those sources, concocted by forcing snatches of
judicial opinions into narrowly pre-conceived subject matter clas-
sffications, and homogenized in order to appear relevant in all ju-
risdictions, sketch a bland and featureless common law sea into
which legislative innovations can sink without trace.19 Still, the in-
adequacies of some insurance research materials is faint excuse.
A lawyer working the Nebraska sources should find the contribute
to the loss statute and its judicial gloss. He also will discover that
the hornbook descriptions of that law can be seriously misleading.
What the hornbooks portray as a statutory standard of broad appli-
cation and certain implications upon closer examination looks
both less sweeping and less tractable. Legislatively crafted excep-
tions and judicial construction have combined with changing fash-
ions in insurance policy design to greatly reduce the potential
reach of the contribute to the loss standard. Moreover, questions
of causal ascription, seldom easy in any context, prove stubbornly
resistant to the familiar verbal formulas when the issue is whether
particular failures of condition should be said to have contributed
to a loss.
This Article will examine the role of the contribute to the loss
standard in Nebraska. It will not tackle the much larger question
of how Nebraska treats failures of insurance policy conditions; in-
deed, one major theme not pursued here concerns how the appli-
cation of various interpretive techniques and equitable doctrines
may help to relieve pressures for a more sweeping statutory stan-
dard. Instead, this Article will concentrate on questions of applica-
tion and effect arising directly from the presence of the contribute
to the loss statute. This review will proceed in two steps. The first
part of this Article will examine problems associated with deter-
mining to which failure of condition defenses the standard should
19. The very recent updating of the Appleman treatise devotes an entire chapter
to the "Effect of Statutory Provisions" on concealment, misrepresentation,
and breach of warranty defenses without ever presenting the language of any
of the statutory provisions with which it purports to deal, without attempting
even a rudimentary classification of those statutes, and without citation to
most of those statutes. See generally 12A J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INsUR-
AlCE LAW & PRACTnCE §§ 7251-7258 (1981). Of course, Appleman deserves ob-
loquy no more than its competitors. For a useful guide to the statutory pres-
ence in this area, don't see 43 AM. JuR. 2D Insurance § 760 (1969) (indicating
applicability of some sort of statute in Nebraska); 45 CJ.S. Insurance
§ 473(4) (d) (1946) (signaling presence of Nebraska statute and its inapplica-
bility to post-loss failures of condition); 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 35:17, :47
.(2d ed. 1961) (confusing standards applicable to misrepresentation defenses
and to failure of condition defenses).
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be applied. The second part of this Article will discuss the nature
of the burden imposed by the contribute to the loss standard for
those defenses to which it is applicable.
II. WHAT DEFENSES ARE SUBJECT TO THE CONTRIBUTE
TO THE LOSS STANDARD?
It may contribute to the efficiency of the discussion to establish
at the outset a few observations concerning insurance policy provi-
sions. In most policies, a bewildering array of policy language pa-
rades across the pages under many different banners. Some
provisions are "declarations," some "exclusions," some "excep-
tions," some "definitions," some "conditions." Many carry no la-
bels at all.20 In legal effect, however, almost all are conditions.12
In the usual insurance relationship, the insured promises almost
20. Indeed, for a time, some insurers solemnly referred to provisions establishing
restrictions on and conditions to the insurer's liability as "Privileges." Fouse,
Policy Contracts in YALE READINGS IN INSURANCE: PERSONAL INSURANCE 250,
261 (2d ed. 1909). Current labeling practices (except where "plain language"
sensibilities have been permitted to flower) generally seem less funny but no
less bizarre.
21. See generally C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 33, at 40-
41 (2d ed. 1880), quoted with approval in General Credit Corp. v. Imperial
Cas. & Indem. Co., 167 Neb. 833, 839-40, 95 N.W.2d 145, 149 (1959) (quoting 3
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 672, at 1930 (rev. ed. 1936)):
Moreover, the words of such a clause will have, in fact, a different
meaning, according to the party who uses them. If they are used in a
contract by the party who is to do the act, they plainly import that he
binds himself to do it; while, if they are used by the party for whose
benefit the act is to be done, they fairly mean that he will require it to
be done, ie. that his own obligation shall be conditional upon its be-
ing done. How then shall it be ascertained to whom the language of
such a clause is to be imputed? If the contract be clearly unilateral
(e.g. a policy of insurance), of course the answer to this question ad-
mits of no doubt. In such a contract only one party speaks, and that
is the covenantor or promisor. Any clause, therefore, in a policy of
insurance, requiring any act to be done by the insured, will be a con-
dition of the covenant or promise of insurance, though its language
may more naturally import a covenant or promise by the insured.
For a more modern rendition of the same point, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS 2d § 227(2) (1981) which states a preference for interpreting
contracts as imposing a duty rather than as erecting a condition "[u]nless the
contract is of a type under which only one party generally undertakes
duties."
[The] preference does not apply when the contract is of a type under
which only the obligor generally undertakes duties. It therefore does
not apply to the typical insurance contract under which only the in-
surer generally undertakes duties, and a term requiring an act to be
done by the insured is not subject to this standard of preference. In
view of the general understanding that only the insurer undertakes
duties, the term will be interpreted as making that event a condition
of the insurer's duty rather than as imposing a duty on the insured.
Id. Comment d.
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nothing. The insurer promises much, but both parties expect the
insurer to perform only for the few who will qualify by satisfying
the many conditions that hedge the insurer's obligation.
Years ago Professor Patterson sought to impose some order on
this jumble by proposing that policy conditions be categorized ac-
cording to the various functions they serve.2 "Coverage provi-
sions" are those that define and delimit the risk transferred to the
insurer. In this category belong descriptions of the insured event
(e.g., "direct loss by fire"); excepted causes (e.g., "enemy attack by
armed forces"); subject matter of the insurance (e.g., "described
residence premises.., located at the above address"); covered or
excluded consequences of the insured event (e.g., "without com-
pensation for loss resulting from interruption of business or manu-
facture"); duration of the insurance (e.g., "Policy Term
Inception Expiration "); and amount of insurance
(e.g., "Liability Limit "). To be contrasted with coverage
provisions are policy conditions designed to allow the insurer to
remove from its underwriting calculus concerns that certain physi-
cal and moral hazards might bring about an insured loss (e.g.,
"Brick, Stone or Masonry Veneer"; "The described dwelling is not
seasonal"; "Other insurance.., is not permitted").23 A third cate-
gory of policy provisions is designed to protect the insurer against
the juridical risks that may hinder loss adjustment efforts (e.g.,
"the insured shall give immediate written notice to the insurer of
any loss ... and render to the Company a proof of loss"; "Provided
there are visible marks of forcible entry upon the exterior of such
vehicle").
All this would be of only taxonomic interest were it not for the
advent of statutes, like section 44-358 of the Nebraska Revised Stat-
utes, intended to restrict the availability of defenses based on fail-
ure of policy conditions. So far as the common law was concerned,
an express condition was an express condition, and "express con-
ditions, whatever their nature, must under any and all circum-
22. The early effort is recorded in Patterson, The Apportionment of Business
Risks through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L REV. 335 (1924), and Patterson,
Warranties in Insurance Law, 34 COLUm L. REv. 595 (1934); the mature for-
mulation is presented in E. PATTERSON, supra note 1, ch. 6. The categories of
policy conditions identified in the text are Patterson's; the examples are
mine, drawn from a modern homeowners policy.
23. Of course, both "excepted cause" provisions-already classed as "coverage"
provisions-and "continuing warranties" can be viewed as policy provisions
by which the insurer seeks to control risks after the policy has been issued.
E. PATERsoN, supra note 1, at 237. In practical effect, therefore, this second
category of policy provisions was conceived by Patterson as encompassing
only "continuing warranties."
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stances, be literally performed .... 24 The incautious reader of
the standard texts might be led to believe that with the imposition
of the contribute to the loss standard all this has changed; in fact,
only some things have changed, and those in quite different ways.
Sorting it all out requires a self-conscious appreciation of the dif-
ferent roles policy conditions can play and the different reactions
they engender. It also is useful to treat separately failures of con-
dition that occur before the inception of the contractual relation-
ship, failures of condition that occur after the insured loss, and
failures of condition that occur after the inception of the contract
but before an insured event has occurred.
A. Pre-Inception Failures of Condition Are Immune
Imagine an applicant for life insurance who fraudulently an-
swers application questions about his medical history; he know-
ingly fails to disclose a recent diagnosis of a serious heart
condition. At common law, a policy issued in reliance upon this
obviously material misrepresentation would be avoidable by the
insurer during the period of contestability, either in an action to
rescind the policy or as a defense to a claim by the beneficiary on
the policy. But what if the c'est tui que vie dies as a result of being
hit by a bus? May the beneficiary successfully contend that the
insurer's misrepresentation defense is not available because the
heart condition did not contribute to the death of the c'est tui que
vie? In several states that have enacted contribute to the loss stat-
utes, that is precisely the result prescribed.25 In Nebraska, how-
ever, the contribute to the loss standard is not applicable to such a
defense.
Why not? The Nebraska contribute to the loss statute speaks to
"[t] he breach of a warranty or condition in any contract or policy
24. F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 845-46 (2d ed.
1970). The authors continue:
No doubt the great concept of freedom of contract comes in to but-
tress the conclusion that any express condition is sacrosant in a way
that no implied condition can ever be. In most respectable academic
literature the idea that express conditions are somehow fundamen-
tally different from implied conditions [and thus unaffected by the
doctrine of substantial performance] is introduced only to be dis-
missed as false or misleading... To many, if not most, practicing
lawyers, however, the idea seems to commend itself as an article of
faith. Counsel for insurance companies,... have been particularly
ardent believers in the sanctity of express conditions.
Id. at 846 (citation omitted).
25. See, e.g., Jackson v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 150 Kan. 86, 90 P.2d 1097
(1939); Snead v. Union Life Ins. Co., 340 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. App. 1960); Madsen v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 RI. 176, 156 A.2d 203 (1959).
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of insurance."26 Because a material misrepresentation upon which
the insurer reasonably relied provides a basis for rescission, the
accuracy of such a representation sometimes is described as a
"condition-precedent-to-formation" of the insurance contract,27
but that does not mean the truth of representations automatically
is a "condition in a contract." The distinction is between "condi-
tions external" and "conditions internal." However, the question
is more complicated than that. Life insurance applications and
policies sometimes include provisions declaring that all applica-
tion answers are "warranties" and that their truthfulness is a con-
dition precedent to any liability of the insurer. For example:
I do hereby declare and agree that each and every statement and answer
contained in this application is material to the risk, and I hereby warrant
all the answers and statements,... to be full, complete and true; and it is
agreed that this warranty shall form the basis and shall be a part of the
contract .... 28
Is that enough to convert a representation into a policy condition
so as to bring the contribute to the loss standard into play?
A primary motivation in the development of statutory restric-
tions on condition defenses was the success with which insurers
employed such provisions to convert misrepresentation defenses,
which required a demonstration of materiality, into failure of con-
dition defenses, which did not. Especially in life insurance, where
application forms could grow unconscionably detailed and the con-
sequences of voidability could be appallingly graphic, popular and
legal intuitions prompted the conclusion that such immaterial fail-
ures of condition should not be the occasions for forfeiture.29 The
26. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-358 (Reissue 1978) (emphasis added).
27. E. PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 282.
28. Kettenbach v. Omaha Life Ass'n, 49 Neb. 842, 847, 69 N.W. 135, 137 (1896).
With not atypical overkill it went on to declare:
I do further agree that if any of the answers or statements made and
contained herein are not full and complete, or that if the same or any
of them, whether made in good faith or otherwise, are in any respect
untrue, then said policy and this contract shall be null and void....
If any statement made in the application for this policy of insurance
is in any respect untrue, then and in each and every such case the
consideration of this contract shall be deemed to have failed and this
policy of insurance shall be null and void.
Id.
29. See, e.g., Immaterial Warranties in Life Insurance, 11 ALB AY UJ. 120 (1875).
There are certain so-called principles of the common law which
not even age can render respectable-ideas which perhaps were rea-
sonable or at least unobjectionable when first enunciated, but which
the world has moved away from or passed by. Three prominent ex-
amples now occur to us, namely: the liability of an innkeeper as an
insurer of his guest's goods, even in case of a fire without the fault of
the former; the absence of any right in an agister to a lien for the
keeping of the cattle; and the avoidance of a contract by the breach of
an immaterial warranty. For the first of these dogmas there might
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early volumes of the Nebraska reports are littered with opinions
that wrestle with whether the insurer had managed to achieve the
transformation from "representation" to "condition."30 What bet-
ter place for legislative intervention to deny the insurer a defense
when the insurer cannot show that the facts misrepresented actu-
ally helped to produce th loss?
Nevertheless, the Nebraska contribute to the loss standard is
not applicable to such defenses; they have been factored out for
separate treatment. Section 44-502, enacted as part of the package
that included the contribute to the loss standard,31 requires that
non-industrial life and endowment policies include:
A provision that all statements made by the insured shall, in the absence
of fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties, and that no such
statement shall avoid the policy unless it is contained in a written applica-
tion, and a copy of such application shall be endorsed upon or attached to
the policy when issued.32
As a result, innocent misrepresentations cannot be converted into
breaches of warranty, but fraudulent misrepresentations can!33
That distinction proves of no consequence, however, because the
first sentence of section 44-358, which is addressed to all lines of
insurance, applies equally to misrepresentations and warranties:
No oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in negotiation for a
contract or policy of insurance by the insured, or in his behalf, shall be
deemed material or defeat or avoid the policy, or prevent its attaching,
unless such misrepresentation or warranty deceived the company to its
injury.34
originally have been some excuse; there is none now. In regard to
the second there could never have been any reasonable difference of
opinion, and as for the last it is one of those monstrous and absurd
perversions of justice that have made the law a subject of reproach
among some of the wisest and most humane of men.
: : [ I]f an insurer inserts these questions and provides that the
answers shall be warranties, the man who undertakes to answer
them and makes an inadvertent mistake that does no harm, nay, that
is less favorable to himself than the strict truth demands, and thus
operates to the benefit of the insurer, has lost the benefit of his con-
tract, and that, too, although the insured may not have been deceived
in the least, but may have known the truth all the time, and with this
knowledge have gone on for half a century taking premiums from its
innocent victim. This is so shocking to the moral and common sense
of the community that plain men get a bad idea of law, of courts and
of the administration of justice.
Id. at 120-21.
30. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Travelers Protective Ass'n of Am., 122 Neb. 329, 240
N.W. 307 (1932); Beeler v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 106 Neb. 853, 184 N.W.
917 (1921); Action Life Ins. Co. v. Rehlaender, 68 Neb. 284, 94 N.W. 129 (1903);
Kettenbach v. Omaha Life Ass'n, 49 Neb. 842, 69 N.W. 135 (1896); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Simmons, 49 Neb. 811, 69 N.W. 125 (1896).
31. See note 4 supra.
32. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-502(4) (Reissue 1978).
33. Gillan v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 143 Neb. 647, 10 N.W.2d 693 (1943).
34. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-358 (Reissue 1978).
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By negative implication, the contribute to the loss standard pre-
scribed by the second sentence of section 44-35835 does not apply to
negotiation-based, pre-inception failures of condition.3 6 It makes
no difference whether the defense asserted is labeled misrepresen-
tation, breach of warranty, failure of condition precedent to liabil-
ity, or failure of a condition precedent to formation of the contract.
For such defenses, the test is whether the insurer was "deceived to
its injury." That- standard, the cases indicate, does not differ from
the common law materiality standard formerly applicable to, mis-
representation defenses.3 7
Nebraska sources do not disclose why the contribute to the loss
standard was not made applicable to pre-inception failures of con-
dition, but at least two hypotheses seem credible. First, a principal
preoccupation of those counseling legislative modification of the
common law rules applicable to failures of condition was the per-
ceived need to check the ability of insurers to evade the material-
ity standard otherwise applicable to misrepresentation defenses.
The first sentence of section 44-358 assures continued application
of the common law misrepresentation rule. Second, pre-inception
misrepresentations and breaches of warranty can be raised at two
different junctures. When asserted as a defense to a claim on the
policy after an insured event has occurred, a contribute to the loss
standard can work well enough: there is a "loss" to which the mis-
represented fact either did or did not contribute. However, when
the insurer seeks to rescind the policy before an insured event-
admittedly, a much less frequent occurrence-the contribute to
35. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
36. See Muhlbach v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n, 108 Neb. 146, 153, 187 N.W. 787,
790 (1922): "It will be observed that this section of the statute is divided into
two clauses. The first relates to matters of statements in the negotiations for
the insurance .... ." See also Security State Bank v. Aetna Ins. Co., 106 Neb.
126, 183 N.W. 92 (1921).
37. See, e.g., Muhlbach v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n, 108 Neb. 146, 153-54, 187
N.W. 787, 790 (1922): "If, through the untrue statement of the insured, the
defendant was induced to issue the policy, and thus become obligated under
its contract, when it would not have done so had a truthful answer been
made, it would seem clear that the defendant was deceived to its injury
... ." But of. Zimmerman v. Continental Cas. Co., 181 Neb. 654, 660, 150
N.W.2d 268, 272 (1967):
While we do not hold that fraudulent misrepresentations in an appli-
cation for accident insurance must also contribute to the accident or
the loss, the jury is entitled to consider the facts as to how the loss
occurred in connection with its determination of fraudulent intent,
and whether the insured's misrepresentations or false statements
were made knowingly with intent to deceive and that the company
was thereby deceived to its injury.
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the loss standard simply does not fit: there has been no "loss" to
which the misrepresented fact could contribute. In Missouri,
where a contribute to the loss standard is applicable only to life
insurance misrepresentation cases, the courts have recognized
this difficulty and have concluded that rescission actions implicitly
are excepted from the statute.38 In Nebraska, the two sentence
structure of section 44-358 avoids this problem. Pre-inception mis-
representations and the failures of condition they sometimes cre-
ate are to be judged by whether the insurer was "deceived to its
injury." As a consequence, one of the most productive sources of
failure of condition litigation has been placed beyond the reach of
the contribute to the loss standard.
B. Post-Casualty Failures of Condition Are Immune
Insurance policies usually include a number of provisions that
condition the insurer's liability on the insured's taking certain ac-
tions after the insured event has occurred. Among the more famil-
iar examples of such conditions are those requiring timely notice
to the insurer after an insured event, cooperation by the insured in
the liability insurer's efforts to investigate a claim and mount a de-
fense, and submission of prescribed proofs of loss. To the extent
that courts and commentators still indulge the distinction, condi-
tions such as these may be denominated conditions subsequent
rather than conditions precedent. At the doctrinal level, little be-
yond allocation of the burden of proof will turn on the outcome of
that now-suspect labeling process.39 At another level, however,
the sense that an insurer defense is based on the failure of a "mere
condition subsequent" often has been associated with the sense
that the failure of condition likely was "only technical," and thus
supplies a proper occasion for applying the various judicial tech-
38. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Glaser, 245 Mo. 377, 385-86, 150 S.W. 549,
550-51 (1912):
It is apparent that this statute applies only to cases in which the
"event on which the policy is to become due" has actually happened,
and the liability of the insurer under the policy is the question to be
determined. It was not intended to restrict the freedom of contract
except in such cases as came within its provisions. The case before
us is not an action to enforce liability under a contract of insurance.
The event on which the obligation is made contingent had not oc-
curred and therefore the rights of the parties are not affected by the
statute, but are to be settled under the general law as though the
statute did not exist.
See also Wells v. Great E. Cas. Co., 40 R.I. 222, 100 A. 395 (1917).
39. For a still-excellent analysis, see Harnett & Thornton, The Insurance Condi-
tion Subsequent: A Needle in a Semantic Haystack, 17 FoRDA t T. REv. 220
(1948). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 224, 230 (1979);
Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE U3. 739, 746-47 (1919)
(tracing the debate back to Coke).
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niques for avoiding or ameliorating the normal consequences of a
breach of condition.40
On a first reading, the second sentence of section 44-358 might
seem to respond to this instinct. Although the historic conception
of warranty in insurance law is restricted to policy conditions
designed to ameliorate the risk that an insured event will occur
and thus does not encompass post-casualty conditions, section 44-
358 does not purport to regulate only breaches of warranty It pro-
vides that "[t]he breach of a warranty or condition ... shall not
avoid the policy nor avail the insurer to avoid liability, unless such
breach shall exist at the time of the loss and contribute to the loss
.... -41 If the "loss" referred to in the statute is understood to be
the adverse impact on the insurer's underwriting results if it be-
comes obligated to perform under the insurance policy, then notice
and similar post-casualty conditions could be treated like those
that come into play before the casualty occurs. On this reading,
failure of an insured automobile owner to give timely notice of
property damage to her automobile would give the insurer a de-
fense only if the insurer could demonstrate that the delay in some
manner prevented the insurer from escaping all or a portion of its
obligation to perform its contractual undertakings. This reading
can claim twin advantages: it subjects post-casualty failures of
condition to the same standard as other post-inception failures of
condition, and it responds to the common intuition that post-casu-
alty breaches of condition often are technical breaches which do
not prejudice the interests of the insurer. It also has disadvan-
tages: it depends upon an especially strained conception of "loss,"
and there is no evidence that it has ever been seriously enter-
tained by any court or commentator.
Instead, there seems to be tacit agreement that "loss" as em-
ployed in section 44-358 means the occurrence of the insured event
that first triggers insurer liability. This poses a dilemma. If the
statute is applicable, the insurer of an automobile damaged by hail
will be permitted to invoke a breach of condition defense only if it
40. The most recent effort to capture the essence of this common instinct is
found in RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981): 'To the extent
that the non-occurrence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfei-
ture, a court may excuse the non-occurrence of that condition unless its oc-
currence was a material part of the agreed exchange." See also Morris,
Waiver & Estoppel in Insurance Policy Litigation, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 925
(1957) (still the best guide to how "underwriting realities" of various policy
and marketing arrangements influence application of waiver and estoppel
doctrines); R. KEETON, supra note 1, ch. 6 (an evocation of the same themes,
more broadly framed); E. PATERSON, supra note 1, at 482-83 (a stylish pres-
entation of the argument that "conditions relating to loss adjustment" are
more vulnerable to waiver and estoppel than other policy provisions).
41. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-358 (Reissue 1978) (emphasis added).
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can demonstrate that the breach existed at the time of the hail
damage and contributed to that hail damage. A failure to give
timely notice of hail damage obviously cannot satisfy these statu-
tory requirements. Indeed, no post-casualty breach of condition
logically can be said to have contributed to the occurrence of the
casualty, so long as we indulge the usual conventions concerning
the temporal relations implied by causal statements.
Does that mean that no post-casualty failure of condition can
supply the basis for an insurer defense? For a time, Nebraska
flirted with this conclusion. In 1931, in George v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,42 the insured failed to give timely notice of a liability
claim against him. The Nebraska Supreme Court struggled with
the question of when the obligation to give notice arose, but ulti-
mately concluded that under the Nebraska statute it did not mat-
ter- "A lack of literal compliance with the provisions of the policy
is insufficient to avoid liability where it does not contribute to the
loss or injure the insurer."43 There is no indication in the opinion
that the court thought the insurer had failed to prove what might
have been proved. Apparently, the court thought it too obvious for
comment that a post-loss breach of condition could not contribute
to that loss.
A year later the Eighth Circuit employed the same conception
of "loss," but used it to support a quite different result. In Ameri-
can Surety Co. v. Bankers' Savings & Loan Association,4 4 the in-
sured under a fidelity bond failed to give the required notice of a
covered employee's defalcation. The insured tried to wrap itself in
the contribute to the loss statute, to no avail. Operating apparently
without benefit of the George opinion, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded: "The statute does not apply. In the nature of things, the
failure to give notice could not have existed at the time of the loss,
or have contributed thereto."4 5 With the statute inapplicable, the
strict common law rule applied 6 so that failure to satisfy the no-
tice condition was enough to warrant a directed verdict for the in-
surer. On retrial, however, the insured invoked the George
construction of the statute and received a judgment against the in-
surer. On a second appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed.4 7 The
George approach would be followed. Further, opined the Eighth
42. 121 Neb. 647, 238 N.W. 36 (1931).
43. Id. at 656, 238 N.W. at 40.
44. 59 F.2d 577 (8th, Cir. 1932).
45. Id. at 580.
46. Pre-statute Nebraska decisions applying the strict common law rule to post-
loss failures of condition include: German Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750, 49
N.W. 711 (1891) (failure to make proofs of loss); McCann v. Aetna Ins. Co., 3
Neb. 198 (1874) (failure to give notice and to make proofs of loss).
47. 67 F.2d 803 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 678 (1934).
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Circuit, "We think this construction by the State Court of last re-
sort is rather more in harmony with the legislative purpose. '48
However, the next time the question was presented, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court changed directions and embraced the posi-
tion first advocated by the Eighth Circuit. In Clark v. State
Farmers Insurance Co.,49 the insured had delayed four years
before giving notice of a fire loss. The supreme court reversed a
trial court decision for the insured. "The statute does not relieve
an insured of the duty of giving notice and proof of loss to an in-
surer before a suit for the recovery of benefits under a fire policy
may be maintained."5 0 According to the court, the contribute to
the loss statute only
relates to those breaches which exist "at the time of loss." It does not
relate to a breach of the terms of a policy which could only arise after the
loss has occurred. It does not deny the insurer the right to rely upon con-
ditions of its policy which the insured is required to perform as a condition
of recovery after the loss has occurred. It relates to the question of a re-
coverable loss and not to the question of procedure to be followed in col-
lecting for the loss after it has occurred. Clearly a notice of loss and proofs
of loss can only be given after the loss has occurred.
To construe the statute as plaintiff contends ... would be to declare
many standard provisions of insurance contracts inoperative.5 1
In Clark, the George precedent was buried in a string citation of
wildly heterogeneous decisions which "do not determine the ques-
tion here presented."92 As late as 1974, in Ach v. Farmers Mutual
Insurance Co.,53 an insured who had failed to comply with a notice
of loss condition in his homeowner's policy sought to resurrect the
George approach in order to contend that the insurer was not
prejudiced by the delay in giving notice. This time the court nailed
the coffin lid shut. Clark was the controlling authority:
It is true that in the earlier case of George v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., supra, this court used the statute in question as a makeweight argu-
ment supporting its opinion, but we did not there really analyze or con-
sider the meaning of the statute. George v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
supra, is disapproved insofar as it relied on the statute.54
To this point, the history of the treatment of post-loss breaches
of condition seems straightforward enough: after a brief flirtation
with the idea that the Nebraska statute completely deprived insur-
ers of defenses based on post-loss failures of condition, the court
concluded that the statute did not apply to such defenses. Thus,
48. 67 F.2d at 806.
49. 142 Neb. 483, 7 N.W.2d 71 (1942).
50. Id. at 488, 7 N.W.2d at 73.
51. Id. at 487-88, 7 N.W.2d at 73.
52. Id. at 489, 7 N.W.2d at 74.
53. 191 Neb. 407, 215 N.W.2d 518 (1974).
54. Id. at 409, 215 N.W.2d at 520.
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the common law rule remained unmodified and any failure, no
matter how technical and immaterial, would entitle the insurer to a
defense. However, by the time the Nebraska court produced the
Ach decision, what apparently was clear in that opinion already
had been undercut by what the court had done elsewhere. In 1966,
in MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sailors,55 the Nebraska Supreme
Court initiated another line of authority which appeared to sanc-
tion significantly different results for at least some post-loss
breach of condition defenses. In Sailors, an omnibus insured
under an automobile liability policy lied to the police and the in-
surer about who was driving the insured car and failed to notify
the insurer when a tort suit was brought against him. The trial
court found that Sailors' conduct "had materially and substantially
breached the terms of the policy but that there was no showing of
prejudice or detriment to the [insurer] ."56 It therefore concluded
that the insurer remained obligated to defend the action against
Sailors. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed. Noting "a sub-
stantial division of authority"57 on the question, the court aligned
itself with "[t]he more recent cases" holding "that an insurer can-
not assert a breach of cooperation clause as a policy defense in the
absence of a showing of prejudice or detriment to the insurer."5 8
Less than three months later, the court again refused to apply
the strict common law rule to post-casualty breaches of conditions.
In Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. Meckna,59 the automobile liability
insurer asserted breach of both the notice and the cooperation con-
ditions of the policy. Citing Sailors, the court reiterated its re-
quirement that the insurer defending on the basis of breach of a
cooperation clause demonstrate "prejudice" or "detriment" as a re-
sult of that breach.60 The court's handling of the notice condition
defense was less direct. It did not purport to apply a prejudice
standard; instead, it ascribed a purpose to the notice requirement,
determined that the failure to give notice did not impede the in-
surer's efforts to accomplish that purpose, and concluded that the
failure to give notice did not entitle the insurer to a defense:
What is the purpose of this provision? Patently, it is to alert the insurer to
a possible claim and to afford it an opportunity to make such investigation
55. 180 Neb. 201, 141 N.W.2d 846 (1966).
56. Id. at 203, 141 N.W.2d at 848.
57. Id. at 204, 141 N.W.2d at 848. See generally Annot., 9 A.LR. 4th 218 (1981).
58. 180 Neb. at 204, 141 N.W.2d at 849. See also Pupkes v. Sailors, 183 Neb. 784, 788-
89, 164 N.W.2d 441, 444 (1969) (garnishment action arising out of same inci-
dent) ('"he question is no longer an open one in this jurisdiction.... Re-
gardless of the nature of the breach, there must be a showing of detriment or
prejudice to the insurer.").
59. 180 Neb. 516, 144 N.W.2d 73 (1966).
60. Id. at 526-29, 144 N.W.2d at 80-81.
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as it deems pertinent to enable it to process any future claim.... Insurer
had all the information Meckna could give it, and had ample notice to per-
mit it to take any and all necessary steps to protect its interest. Under the
facts in this case, there is no merit to this assignment [of error by the trial
court].61
The Meckna opinion does not explain why the prejudice stan-
dard employed for the cooperation condition defense was not ap-
plied to the notice condition defense. Indeed, the difference may
be more apparent than real. The conclusion that the notice de-
fense should fail could have been rationalized in the same terms
used by the court in its discussion of the cooperation clause de-
fense: the notice defense failed because the insurer failed to show
"prejudice" or "detriment" resulting from that breach of condition.
Still, the court seemed to go out of its way to employ different ver-
bal structures to explain the unavailability of the two defenses,
and the distinction thus created remains a striking and suggestive
feature of the Meckna opinion.
The reported opinions since Meckna have been infrequent and
do little to clarify the Nebraska position on post-loss failures of
condition.62 In 1969, in Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp.,63
an insurer's defense asserted failure to satisfy a machinery and
equipment floater policy condition requiring proofs of loss within
ninety days of the occurrence. The federal district court did not
squarely face the prejudice question; instead, it quoted from
Meckna, observed that the insurer had received actual notice of
the loss within four days of the occurrence, seemed to conflate
proof of loss conditions and notice conditions, and concluded that
no defense should be available. 64 Also in 1969, in Trausch v.
Knecht,65 the Nebraska court clearly said that an insured's failure
to notify his liability insurer that a suit against him had begun
should not provide the insurer a defense "in the absence of
61. Id. at 525-26, 144 N.W.2d at 79-80.
62. The prejudice issue often does not arise because the court concludes that the
facts alleged do not constitute a breach of condition. However, it is not al-
ways easy to maintain a clear distinction between an argument that a delay
in giving notice did not prejudice the insurer and an argument that a delay in
giving notice did not breach the policy condition because the notice was given
"with reasonable celerity, with reasonable and proper diligence, and what is a
reasonable time depends upon all the facts and circumstances of each partic-
ular case." Keene Coop. Grain & Supply Co. v. Farmers Union Indus. Mut.
Ins. Co., 177 Neb. 287, 291, 128 N.W.2d 773, 777 (1964). See, e.g., R.C. Walters
Co. v. DeBower, 191 Neb. 544, 216 N.W.2d 515 (1974) (prejudice caused the
insurer by the delay is basis for determination that the delay was
unreasonable).
63. 298 F. Supp. 898 (D. Neb. 1969).
64. Id. at 903-04.
65. 184 Neb. 134, 165 N.W.2d 738 (1969).
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prejudice."66 However, that opinion later was withdrawn,67 for rea-
sons that may not have related to the failure of condition de-
fense.68 Then, in 1974, the Ach decision 69 permitted a property
insurer a notice condition defense without a demonstration of
prejudice, on the reasoning that George, the decision upon which
the insured relied, had been overruled in-Clark. The Ach opinion
and the briefs of the parties give no hint of the existence of the
Sailors/Meckna line of decisions. Thereafter, in 1978, in Omaha
66. Id. at 137, 165 N.W.2d at 741. The court stated.
"The rule firmly established by weight of authority is that where
provisions relating to notice of accident and forwarding of a sum-
mons or other process are made conditions precedent to recovery,
the failure to act with reasonable timeliness will release the insurer
from the contractual obligation, although no prejudice may have re-
sulted." 2 Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, s. 13.18, p. 13-45. It is
then stated that there is a present-day tendency to consider automo-
bile insurance as not only a contract between the insurer and the
insured, but also a contract for the benefit of the public, and to hold
the insurer liable in the absence of prejudice. Nebraska appears to
follow the latter rule. In MFA Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 180 Neb. 201,
141 N.W.2d 846, it is held that: "An insurer cannot assert a breach of
the cooperation clause as a policy defense in the absence of a show-
ing of prejudice or detriment to the insurer."
Id. However, the court concluded that the default judgment rendered against
the insured before the insurer learned of the suit "definitely prejudiced" the
insurer, id., thus warranting dismissal of the garnishee's action against the
insurer. This provoked a stinging dissent from Chief Justice White:
Properly interpreted the insurance company's sole claim of
prejudice is the excessiveness of the default judgment entered
against it. We now hold in this garnishment action that it was
prejudiced because it did not receive the notice and summons of suit.
Therefore, I feel, its relief should go no further than the degree of
prejudice that it suffers from the entry of the claimed excessive de-
fault judgment. The remedy granted should not overreach the mis-
chief sought to be prevented. It would appear that the plaintiff
should be given a full opportunity to remove the mischief of the de-
fault judgment in the garnishment action by an offer to stipulate to
the setting aside of the entry of the default judgment, or by its con-
sent to such entry, or by giving the garnishee a full opportunity to
prove the amount and the nature of the prejudice that it has suffered
as a result of the entry of the excessive default judgment.
[O]ur rule that prejudice must be shown cannot logically ex-
tend beyond relief for the prejudice actually demonstrated by an ex-
cessive default judgment.
Id. at 140-41, 165 N.W.2d at 742-43.
67. Trausch v. Knecht, 184 Neb. 511, 169 N.W.2d 269 (1969).
68. The court stated: 'The inconclusiveness of material evidence and the indefi-
niteness of the parties in the applicability of certain principles of law flowing
therefrom requires, in the interest of justice, that a retrial be had. . . ." Id.
at 512, 169 N.W.2d at 270. Those with a penchant for the daedal may care to
consult the briefs, which are similarly opaque.
69. Ach v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 407, 215 N.W.2d 518 (1974). See text
accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
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Paper Stock Co. v. California Union Insurance Co.,70 the Nebraska
court held that a misrepresentation of fact in a proof of loss, in vio-
lation of an express policy condition, would support a defense only
if the insurer "'acted upon such false statements, or was in some
manner prejudiced by or affected by them.' "71 The Omaha Paper
Stock opinion made no reference to the Ach or the Sailors/
Meckna lines of authority; instead, it located roots for its result in
nineteenth century misrepresentation cases that denied relief un-
less detrimental reliance could be shown.72 Finally, in 1980, in
Dockendorf v. Orner,73 the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a
summary judgment for the insurer predicated on the insured's fail-
ure to satisfy a 120-day notice condition. The court cited no Ne-
braska authority, but instead settled for a bald citation to Corpus
Juris Secundum.74 Ironically, the C.J.S. reference is supported by
a mis-citation to American Surety,75 the since-discredited Eighth
Circuit decision holding that post-loss failure of notice condition
defenses require a demonstration that the failure contributed to
the loss!
Just what is one to make of all this? Has the "prejudice" inno-
vation of Sailors and Meckna implicitly been rolled back by Ach
and Dockendor? Is the different treatment accorded notice condi-
tions and cooperation conditions in Meckna significant? Did the
court's doubts about the first Trausch opinion extend to its broad
endorsement of a prejudice standard? Or can these apparently dif-
fering signals be rationalized on bases left inarticulate in the opin-
ions? Certainly the inference that a breach of condition inevitably
(or usually) prejudices the insurer may be engendered more read-
ily for some kinds of breaches than for others. Clark and Ach did
both involve property insurance policies, while the Sailors/
Meckna line of cases involved liability insurance, and Dockendorf
involved a fidelity bond. Those are differences, but they hardly
seem to supply a compelling basis upon which to ground princi-
-pled distinctions. Is an insurer really more likely to be prejudiced
by a failure of a notice condition in a property insurance setting?
70. 200 Neb. 31, 262 N.W.2d 175 (1978).
71. Id. at 38, 262 N.W.2d at 179 (quoting Havlik v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
87 Neb. 427, 430, 127 N.W. 248, 249 (1910)).
72. The court cited Havlik v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 87 Neb. 427,127 N.W.
248 (1910), and Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Winn, 27 Neb. 649,43 N.W.
401 (1889).
73. 206 Neb. 456, 293 N.W.2d 395 (1980).
74. Id. at 461, 293 N.W.2d at 398 (citing 45 C.T.S. Insurance § 1092 (1946)).
75. 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 1092, at 1328 n.80 (1940) (citing American Sur. Co. v.
Bankers' Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1932), rev'd on reh., 67 F.2d
803 (8th Cir. 1933)). For a discussion of American Surety, see text accompa-
nying notes 44-48 supra.
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Can there be any justification for treating a notice condition and a
cooperation condition differently? Should post-loss condition de-
fenses in liability insurance settings be subject to a prejudice re-
quirement because of the third-party interests involved? At some
early point one's enthusiasm for the search for premises to ration-
alize this erratic pattern begins to flag. A return visit to the opin-
ions does not help. To read them is to conclude that such
premises, if they exist, lie remarkably well concealed beneath a
surface well-glossed in conclusionary rhetoric.
Perhaps a better reaction to this history is to treat Ach and
Dockendorf as aberrations and not as significant barriers to ex-
plicit recognition of a judicially created prejudice standard against
which to measure all post-casualty breaches of condition. A simi-
lar development, though far from universal, has progressed rapidly
in recent years in other jurisdictions.76 Absent the Ach and Dock-
76. See, e.g., Johnson Controls v. Bowes, 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1831, 409 N.E.2d 185
(1980); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977); Picker-
ing v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I. 143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971); Factory
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kennedy, 256 S.C. 376, 182 S.E.2d 727 (1971); Ore-
gon Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 85 Wash. 2d 372, 535 P.2d 816 (1975).
Commentary documenting and evaluating this trend has been remarkably
scant. Shure, Contract Provisions for Notice and Proof of Loss after Discov-
ery of Loss Are Conditions Precedent to Insured's Right of Recovery, 1967
ABA INs., NEG. & Comp. LAw PRoc. 95, provides a useful though hostile dis-
cussion of early developments involving sureties. Comment, The Materiality
of Prejudice to the Insurer as a Result of the Insured's Failure to Give Timely
Notice, 74 DicK. L. REv. 260 (1970), provides a rehearsal of the arguments for
a prejudice requirement, with the focus on liability insurance.
Perhaps the best presentation of the arguments and authorities is found
in the majority and dissenting opinions in Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472
Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977). There the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
changed the long-standing Pennsylvania law to require that auto liability in-
surers invoking notice clause defenses show not only that the provision was
breached but also that the insurer suffered prejudice as a result.
[U] nder our prior decisions, a party claiming rights under a liability
insurance policy has had the burden of proving compliance with the
terms and conditions of that policy and the determination whether to
relieve the insurer of its obligations under the policy on the ground of
late notice has depended only on the length of delay in giving the
notice and the reasons offered to excuse the delay. As such, our prior
decisions are in line with the rule applied in a majority of jurisdic-
tions. See Annot. 18 A.L.R.2d 443 (1951); 8 J. Appleman, Insurance
Law and Practice § 4732 (1962), and cases cited therein. Our re-
search indicates, however, a trend of late in several jurisdictions
away from the classic contractual approach towards a view that con-
siders prejudice to the insurance company as a material factor in de-
termining whether to relieve the insurance company of its coverage
obligations by virtue of late notification. Even in these last men-
tioned jurisdictions, however, there is no agreement as to whether
the insurer has the initial burden of demonstrating prejudice. Some
courts place the burden on the claimant to establish an absence of
prejudice to the insurer in order to recover on the policy despite late
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endorf embarrassments, the Sailors/Meckna line of cases might
be sufficient to warrant announcing its adoption in Nebraska as
well. One suspects that the failure of the Nebraska opinions to
give more overt and consistent recognition to a prejudice standard
has less to do with judicial reservations about its appropriateness
than with the inertia and frictions inevitable in a case by case elab-
oration spread over a long span of years. The prejudice argument
was not briefed in Ach or Dockendorf, but the point is much more
pervasive than that. The cases examined here reflect a myopia en-
grained in the classification system of the Nebraska Digest, the in-
surance treatises, and the habits of mind they help to cement. The
result is a disposition among all concerned to crawl too quickly
into narrow subject-matter pigeon holes, and to think too infre-
quently of "conditions" as recurring phenomena calling for the ap-
plication of recurring conceptual tools. Thus, it hardly is
surprising that what has emerged is not a coherent law of "condi-
tions," or even of "post-loss conditions," but rather an atomistic
array of discrete rules apparently limited to the specific contexts in
which they were generated. It is not surprising, but neither is it
inevitable, and it certainly is not desirable. At the next opportu-
nity, the Nebraska court should rationalize this mess by frankly
declaring that in Nebraska post-casualty breaches of condition, of
notice, while others require the insurance company to show that it
was prejudiced by the tardiness of the notice in order to escape lia-
bility. We think the preferable rule is that which requires the insur-
ance company to prove not only that the notice provision was
breached, but also that it suffered prejudice as a consequence.
Id. at 71-72, 371 A.2d at 195-96 (footnotes omitted). The court carefully de-
tailed its reasons why the assumptions underlying the strict contractual ap-
proach to conditions did not hold for adhesive post-loss notice provisions, id.
at 73-74, 371 A.2d at 196-97, and why a prejudice requirement was consistent
with the legitimate interests of the insurer.
[A] reasonable notice clause is designed to protect the insurance
company from being placed in a substantially less favorable position
than it would have been in had timely notice been provided, e.g., be-
ing forced to pay a claim against which it has not had an opportunity
to defend effectively. In short, the function of a notice requirement is
to protect the insurance company's interests from being prejudiced.
Where the insurance company's interests have not been harmed by a
late notice, even in the absence of extenuating circumstances to ex-
cuse the tardiness, the reason behind the notice condition in the pol-
icy is lacking, and it follows neither logic nor fairness to relieve the
insurance company of its obligations under the policy in such a situa-
tion .... We have in the past excused a condition of forfeiture where
to give it effect would have been purely arbitrary and without reason,
and we are of the opinion that, in the absence of prejudice to the
insurance company, such a situation exists in the context of a late
notice of accident.
Id. at 75-76, 371 A.2d at 197. The counterarguments are ably presented in Jus-
tice Pomeroy's dissent. Id. at 87-94, 371 A.2d at 203-07.
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all kinds, will support insurer defenses only if the breach can be
shown to have prejudiced the insurer.
C. Post-Inception, Pre-Loss Failures of Coverage Clause
Conditions Are Immune
The contribute to the loss standard is inapplicable to defenses
generated by events before the inception of the contractual rela-
tionship and to those generated after the insured event has oc-
curred. But what of the middle ground, the post-inception, pre-loss
failure of condition? Here, too, the answers come grudgingly.
Consider the most recent request that the Nebraska Supreme
Court require application of the contribute to the loss standard to
such a failure of condition. In Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club,
Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co.,77 the policy in which the insurer
promised to indemnify the insured for hull damage to the covered
aircraft clearly conditioned that obligation on the plane being
piloted by a properly certificated pilot. This the policy accom-
plished in two interwoven provisions. The first, "Item 7" on the
declarations page, read as follows: "Only the following pilot or pi-
lots holding valid and effective pilot and medical certificates with
ratings as required by the Federal Aviation Administration for the
flight involved will operate the aircraft in flight ... ."78 On the
second page of the policy, under an "EXCLUSIONS" heading, the
policy provided. "This policy does not apply: * * * 2. to any occur-
rence or to any loss or damage occurring while the aircraft is oper-
ated in flight by other than the pilot or pilots set forth under Item 7
of the Declarations .... -"79 The plane was damaged while being
operated in flight by a pilot whose medical certificate had expired.
An insured who consulted only the statute might with some jus-
tification conclude that it prescribed a contribute to the loss stan-
dard for all such failures of condition:
The breach of a warranty or condition in any contract or policy of insur-
ance shall not avoid the policy nor avail the insurer to avoid liability, un-
less such breach shall exist at the time of the loss and contribute to the
loss, anything in the policy or contract of insurance to the contrary
notwithstanding.8 0
Not so, the insurer argued; the policy provisions upon which the
insurer's defense rested were "coverage limitations" and thus fell
within an implied exception to the statutory requirement. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment for the
insurer.
77. 189 Neb. 610, 204 N.W.2d 162 (1973).
78. Id. at 612, 204 N.W.2d at 163.
79. Id.
80. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-358 (Reissue 1978).
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Item 7 of the declarations standing alone might well be interpreted as a
warranty or a condition, but any such interpretation cannot be extended
to the separate exclusion clause. The exclusion clause here provides that
the policy does not apply to any "damage occurring while the aircraft is
operated in flight by other than the pilot or pilots set forth under Item 7 of
the Declarations." Coverage is excluded while the plane is operated in
flight by anyone except the pilot or pilots described separately in the dec-
larations. Both the exclusion clause and the declaration are clear and un-
ambiguous. The exclusion does not constitute either a warranty or a
condition within the meaning of section 44-358, R!.S. 1943.81
What should one make of the Sky Divers decision? Two conclu-
sions seem appropriate. First, the court correctly-and not for the
first time-recognized that the apparently comprehensive lan-
guage of the statute must be read as subject to an implied excep-
tion for defenses that assert that the insured failed to satisfy a
policy condition which operates to define the policy's "coverage."
Second, the court improperly classified the defense that the pilot
lacked the requisite certificate as outside the statute's ambit, and
in the process seemed to sanction a classification criterion that is
unworkable, likely to subvert the manifest purpose of the statute,
and at odds with the court's earlier decisions. Both points warrant
examination.
1. The Implied Exception for Coverage Clause Defenses
A moment's thought will persuade that not all failures of condi-
tion occurring after inception and before loss belong within the
81. Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610, 613,
204 N.W.2d 162, 164 (1973). The court continued-
It is well established that an aircraft insurance policy may ex-
clude coverage when the airplane is flown by certain types of persons
or pilots. See 11 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 42:634, p. 315. The insurer
under an aircraft insurance policy may lawfully exclude certain risks
from the coverage of its policy and where damage occurs during the
operation of the insured aircraft under circumstances as to which the
policy excludes coverage, there is no coverage [citing an Arizona de-
cision]....
... Under language in an aircraft policy excluding coverage
"while such aircraft is in flight unless the pilot in command of the
aircraft is properly certified * * *," it has been held that the lapse of
a pilot's medical certificate excluded coverage whether or not there
was any causal connection between the breach of an exclusionary
clause and the accident [citing North Carolina and Florida
decisions].
Id. at 613-14, 204 N.W.2d at 164.
Of course, these last paragraphs provide only an inapt rhetorical flourish.
The insured was not challenging the validity of the policy conditions; it was
asserting that their effect had been statutorily altered by the contribute to the
loss standard. Further, it hardly furthers the inquiry to detail the effects
given similar policy provisions in jurisdictions that do not have statutes com-
parable to the Nebraska statute invoked by the insured.
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statute. To use an absurd example, imagine a claim on a life insur-
ance policy where the insurer defends on the ground that the c'est
tui que vie has not died. Indisputably, the policy makes death of
the c'est tui que vie a condition precedent to the obligation of the
insurer to pay the death benefits to the beneficiary. Should the
beneficiary be allowed to recover in the face of a demonstration
that the c'est tui que vie is still alive, absent some showing by the
insurer that the failure to die contributed to the death? Framed in
that manner, the question is nonsense, and the answer is obvious.
The statute simply does not fit such a defense, even though the
statute purports to apply to all failure of condition defenses, and
the insurer is asserting a failure of condition defense.
It is not difficult to generate an extensive list of failure of condi-
tion defenses that do not seem compatible with the statutory
formula. A defense that a policyholder has failed to pay a renewal
premium, so that the policy has lapsed, may be characterized as a
failure of condition defense, yet it seems silly to suggest that the
insurer be subjected to the impossible task of demonstrating a
causal nexus between that failure and the death of the c'est tui que
vie. So too with the car owner who insures against property dam-
age caused by collision but does not buy comprehensive coverage;
when her car burns, can she prevail on the argument that her fail-
ure to have a collision does not bar recovery because that failure
did not contribute to the loss? And what of the insured whose au-
tomobile policy includes "comprehensive" but not "collision"? If
his car is damaged in a collision, should the statute be read to pre-
scribe an inquiry into whether the collision contributed to the colli-
sion? Of course not. Such questions answer themselves.
What is there about such defenses that makes the inappropri-
ateness of the statutory standard so obvious? The answer tradi-
tionally has been that these defenses assert a failure to satisfy a
"coverage clause,"82 and thus by definition involve matters so cen-
tral to the insurance relationship that they can never be the sort of
"merely technical" defenses to which the statute was supposed to
respond. Of course, this response only reframes the question. We
may readily concede that the failure of the c'est tui que vie to shuf-
fle off this mortal coil hardly qualifies as an insignificant departure
from the assumptions upon which the insurer promised to pay
death benefits-it is, after all, a life insurance policy the benefici-
ary is seeking to enforce. Similarly, we need not worry long about
how to classify the provision in a family automobile policy declar-
ing that the insured automobile is principally garaged at the ad-
dress provided for the named insured; in both form and substance
82. See, e.g., R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 6.6(b).
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this provision is a traditional warranty and thus a condition to
which the statute should apply. But what of the provisions in-
volved in Sky Divers? Are they immune "coverage clauses" or
"conditions" subject to the statute? Any second semester Con-
tracts student will recognize that they establish a condition prece-
dent to the insurer's duty to pay for hull damage, but it requirbs no
abuse of language or logic to say that they define when the cover-
age will be in effect. The dilemma thus posed is obvious. To say
that "coverage clauses" should not be subject to the statute regu-
lating "conditions" is to provide little guidance when virtually
every policy provision is a condition which plausibly can be said to
help establish the "coverage" provided by the policy.
2. Determining the Scope of the Coverage Clause Exception
The Nebraska Supreme Court has never tried to explain how it
distinguishes immune coverage clauses from conditions that are
subject to the statute. Instead it has proceeded, as it did in Sky
Divers, as though confident that it will recognize a coverage de-
fense when it encounters one. In this fashion, it has classified as
immune from the statutory standard83 the lack of certificate de-
fense involved in Sky Divers,84 a defense that the insured was
killed while flying in a scheduled aircraft otherwise than as a fare
paying passenger,8 5 and defenses that the policy did not cover the
period during which the loss occurred 86 or the interest for which
indemnification was sought.87 In the same manner it has included
within the statute's reach defenses based on provisions prohibiting
changes in interest in the property insured,88 other insurance,8 9
changes in location of insured property,9 0 failure to use due care to
83. The cases catalogued here are only those in which the court rejected an argu-
ment that the statute should be applicable; the reports are full of decisions in
which the court has given literal effect to a coverage clause without address-
ig if or why it should be outside the statutory ambit. See, e.g., Peony Park,
Inc. v. Security Ins. Co., 137 Neb. 504, 289 N.W. 848 (1940).
84. Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610, 204
N.W.2d 162 (1973). See notes 77-81 & accompanying text supra.
85. Krause v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 844, 5 N.W.2d 229 (1942).
86. Christiansen v. Moore, 184 Neb. 818, 172 N.W.2d 620 (1969). See also American
Employers' Ins. Co. v. Roundup Coal Mining Co., 73 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1934).
87. Krug Park Amusement Co. v. New York Underwriters' Ins. Co., 129 Neb. 239,
261 N.W. 364 (1935); Stephenson v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 100 Neb. 456, 160
N.W. 962 (1916).
88. Calnon v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 114 Neb. 194, 206 N.W. 765 (1925); Se-
curity State Bank v. Aetna Ins. Co., 106 Neb. 126, 183 N.W. 92 (1921).
89. Slafter v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 209,5 N.W.2d 217 (1942); New-
man v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 122 Neb. 94,239 N.W. 464 (1931).
90. Johnson v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 125 Neb. 759, 251 N.W. 821 (1933); Mayfield v.
North River Ins. Co., 122 Neb. 63, 239 N.W. 197 (1931); Hannah v. American
Live Stock Ins. Co., 111 Neb. 660, 197 N.W. 404 (1924).
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protect damaged property against theft,91 and failure to properly
notify the insurer of changes in the property insured.92 The opin-
ions announcing these classification decisions contain almost no
direct guidance concerning the distinction being employed. Never-
theless, most of the results are unexceptionable, and examining
the kinds of policy provisions placed in each category can prove
instructive.
Consider, for example, two early decisions involving the then-
standard provision making property insurance policies "void" if
any change in interest, title, or possession should occur.93 In Ste-
phenson v. Germania Fire Insurance CO.,94 the insurer entered
into a fire insurance contract with Rice covering Rice's building.
During the policy term, Rice sold the building to the plaintiff, and it
later burned. The plaintiff sought to argue that the breach of con-
dition-the change of ownership--did not contribute to the loss as
required by the statute. The supreme court refused to tolerate
such nonsense. In the court's view, the defense only nominally
was based on a breach of condition; rather, said the court, "[i]t is
the entire absence of a contract relation between the plaintiff and
defendant that is relied on as a defense." 95 However, a few years
later, in Calnon v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co ,96 where the
insured tried to recover for a loss to the insured property over the
insurer's defense that the insured had mortgaged the property,
thus violating the very condition involved in Stephenson, the court
held that the defense was subject to the contribute to the loss stan-
dard of the statute.
What is the basis for this distinction? The court did no more
than hint. Quite clearly, though, one may discard any notion that
the results turned on vagaries in the policy language or in the facts
to which it was applied: in each case, the policy language was the
same, and in each the change in title and interest was sufficient to
91. Sanks v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 131 Neb. 266, 267 N.W. 454 (1936).
92. Ware v. Home Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 135 Neb. 329, 281 N.W. 617 (1938).
93. The provision read as follows:
This entire policy unless otherwise provided by agreement in-
dorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void ... if the interest of the
insured be other than unconditional or sole ownership ... or if any
changes, other than by death of the insured, take place in the inter-
est, title, or possession of the subject of the insurance,. . . whether
by legal process or judgment or by voluntary act of the insured, or
otherwise ....
Quoted in Krug Park Amusement Co. v. New York Underwriters' Ins. Co., 129
Neb. 239, 244, 261 N.W. 364, 372 (1935).
94. 100 Neb. 456, 160 N.W. 962 (1916).
95. Id. at 458, 160 N.W. at 963.
96. 114 Neb. 194, 206 N.W. 765 (1925).
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trigger the policy provision making the policy void.97 True, there
were differences in the relationships between insurers and plain-
tiffs, but why should that matter? Stephenson had never enjoyed a
contractual relationship with Germania, and Calnon's policy said
that his contractual relationship with Fidelity-Phenix ended the
moment he mortgaged the property. Why did the court choose to
emphasize the "absence of a contract" in Stephenson, but not in
Calnon?
That question should prove troubling only if we cannot probe
beneath the language in which the policy condition is couched in
order to investigate the functions the provision was asked to serve.
To its considerable credit, the Nebraska Supreme Court usually
has not allowed its classification decisions to be held thrall to form.
Many opinions do not bother to record the language of the policy
provision being classified.98 Others note the text of the provision,
but make nothing of it.99 The court's disparate treatment of the
forfeiting conditions in Stephenson and Calnon is not unusual; pro-
visions couched as forfeiting or suspensive conditions sometimes
have been classed as within the statute, 0 0 sometimes as beyond
its reach.101 In view of this history, the Sky Divers opinion's appar-
ent emphasis on the location and style of the policy prohibitions of
uncertificated pilots seems more a rhetorical flourish than an ap-
plication of a formal approach to classification decisions. Through-
out the history of the statute, form has not been determinative.
But if not form, then what?
97. Pre-statute decisions applying the policy provision to similar facts include
Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Collins, 61 Neb. 198, 85 N.W. 54 (1901), and Farmers' &
Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 56 Neb. 284, 76 N.W. 577 (1898), affd on reh., 58
Neb. 522, 78 N.W. 1054 (1899).
98. See, e.g., Newman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 122 Neb. 94, 239 N.W. 464
(1931); Hannah v. American Live Stock Ins. Co., 111 Neb. 660, 197 N.W. 404
(1924).
99. See, e.g., Sanks v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 131 Neb. 266, 267 N.W. 454
(1936); Krug Park Amusement Co. v. New York Underwriters' Ins. Co., 129
Neb. 239,261 N.W. 364 (1935); Mayfleld v. North River Ins. Co., 122 Neb. 63,239
N.W. 197 (1931).
100. See, e.g., Slafter v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 209, 5 N.W.2d 217
(1942) (provision making policy voidable by insurer for breach of condition);
Mayfleld v.. North River Ins. Co., 122 Neb. 63, 239 N.W. 197 (1931) (provision
limiting coverage to property while located certain places).
101. See, e.g., Krause v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 844,5 N.W.2d 229 (1942)
(provision removing from coverage losses while insured is in certain vehi-
cles); Krug Park Amusement Co. v. New York Underwriters' Ins. Co., 129
Neb. 239, 261 N.W. 364 (1935) (provision declaring entire policy void if condi-
tion broken).
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a. Method 1: Ask Which Conditions Function to Define
Coverage and Thus Are Beyond the Reach of the
Statute
One way to attempt to identify substantive differences beneath
surface similarities is to employ Patterson's subclasses of "cover-
age" provisions102 as a guide to policy conditions likely to be im-
mune from the statutory standard. Rather than being content to
ask if a provision defines the risk assumed, we might ask if it func-
tions to establish "the insured event," "excepted causes," "inter-
ests insured," "consequences of named events which are or are not
covered," "duration of insurance," or "amount of insurance." The
perspective supplied by this list of varieties of coverage provisions
may seem to make it obvious that the Stephenson and Calnon in-
surers sought to put the provision prohibiting changes in interest
or title to quite different uses. In Stephenson,0 3 the provision was
used to establish that the insurer's duty to indemnify did not run
with the property to whomever might acquire an interest. The in-
surer asserted that the interest for which indemnification was de-
manded-the purchaser's interest-was not the interest the
insured agreed to protect. Given that use, it is not surprising that
the policy provision should be classed as a coverage provision ly-
ing outside the statute's ambit.104 In Calnon,0 5 however, invoking
the provision served no such purpose. There the provision did not
operate to define the contours of the risk transferred. The plaintiff
was the original insured and the gravaman of the insurer's objec-
tion was that the insured, by mortgaging the property, might have
subjected the insurer to increased moral hazard. Quite properly,
this method suggests, the court held the Calnon insurer to the bur-
102. See generally E. PATrERSON, supra note 1, ch. 6, discussed in note 22 & accom-
panying text supra.
103. Stephenson v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 100 Neb. 456, 160 N.W. 962 (1916), fol-
lowed in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Ruddy, 299 F. 189 (8th Cir. 1924).
104. An aside in Krug Park Amusement Co. v. New York Underwriters' Ins. Co.,
129 Neb. 239, 261 N.W. 364 (1935), makes the point quite clearly. In Krug, the
court refused to apply the statute to the defense that the insured "bathing
company" had transferred insured personal property to the plaintiff:
The plaintiff in this case is not a party to the insurance contract, nor
has any indorsement been made upon the policy transferring to it
the interest of the bathing company. It is quite possible that, in an
action brought by the bathing company upon the policy, [the contrib-
ute to the loss statute] ... would be applicable, and the mere trans-
fer of title, not contributing to the loss, would not void the policy.
But, there being no contractual relation between the plaintiff and the
insurer, we hold that this statute has no application.
Id. at 259, 261 N.W. at 373.
105. Calnon v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 114 Neb. 194, 206 N.W. 765 (1925). See
text accompanying note 96 supra.
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den of demonstrating that violation of the provision contributed to
the loss.
Patterson's declension of the "coverage clause" idea also may
seem to provide a more satisfactory basis for explaining our intui-
tion that the statute should not apply to policy conditions that ap-
pear incompatible with the statutory formula. Thus, to assert that
the c'est tui que vie is not dead is to argue the absence of the in-
sured event; the failure to pay a renewal premium takes the in-
sured beyond the duration of the insurance; collision is an
excepted cause of loss under a comprehensive policy, fire under a
collision policy. The same technique can also be invoked to ex-
plain the Nebraska court's classification decisions: conditions clas-
sified as beyond the reach of the statute either are, or seem to have
been understood to be, coverage clauses fitting one or another of
Patterson's functional subcategories.
Ultimately, however, even the most rigorous application of the
Patterson list of varieties of coverage provisions advances the anal-
ysis only slightly over what an intuitive, seat-of-the-pants ap-
proach can provide. Again, Sky Divers1a6 supplies an apt example.
Are the provisions designed to protect the insurer against the pos-
sibility that an uncertificated pilot will fly the plane coverage provi-
sions or conditions subject to the statute? Doubtless, the insurer
was as firm in its wish not to assume the risk that loss would occur
while the plane was being flown by an uncertificated pilot as in its
desire not to provide coverage for damage in excess of the policy
limits or occurring after the policy expires.10 7 Doubtless, too, few
would find it difficult to shove the provisions into one or more of
Patterson's subcategories: 08 they help to define "the insured
event"--property damage to the plane while it is being flown by a
properly certificated pilot; they help to define the "duration of the
insurance"--coverage is provided for those periods during the pol-
icy term when there is no violation of the certification require-
ments. On the other hand, the insured might plausibly argue that
the certification provisions add nothing to what the policy other-
106. See notes 77-81 & accompanying text supra.
107. Not everyone agrees that the protections to be gained from requiring a cur-
rent medical certificate are worth the candle:
Such a certificate is no longer required by certain major underwrit-
ers. They realize that as a practical matter this risk is minimal. A
current medical certificate does not assure the physical condition of
the pilot on any given occasion, and in most instances where a pilot
was operating an aircraft without a current medical certificate, it was
inadvertent and in no way related to the loss.
Davis, Proposed Standardized General Aviation Insurance Policy--Pilot
Clause and Exclusions, 43 J. Am L & CoM. 371, 373 (1977) (footnotes
omitted).
108. See notes 22-23 & accompanying text supra.
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wise tells us about the coverage provided-this plane, this year,
against damage to the hull-but instead function as a traditional
warranty to protect the insurer against a potential cause of loss-
unqualified pilots.
The problem thus exposed is that Patterson's categories of cov-
erage provisions are descriptive, rather than analytic, and quite
fuzzy around the edges. They can be manipulated by the simple
expedient of couching conditions as descriptions of the insured
event or as statements of the duration of the coverage. Indeed,
most of the traditional warranty provisions appear in policies
framed as forfeiting conditions-"if ... ,then this policy shall be
void"-or suspensive conditions--" while located as described
herein"--both of which can seem to be encompassed by Patter-
son's taxonomy of coverage provisions. Thus, even the Calnon
provision,10 9 a supposedly clear example of a traditional warranty
designed to ameliorate moral hazard, can be characterized as a
statement that helps to define the duration of the coverage. For
one scanning policy provisions in search of immune coverage pro-
visions, the reality is harsh. Only common sense stands in the way
of the ultimate absurdity: a conclusion that all of the conditions
precedent to the insurer's liability help to define the coverage pro-
vided and thus should be immune from the statute. Because most
policy provisions in some sense help to define coverage, an attempt
to derive a workable classification scheme by asking if a policy pro-
vision functions to define coverage leads to a conceptual cul-de-
sac. Thus, the question remains: which policy provisions should
be subject to the contribute to the loss statute?
b. Method 2: Ask Which Conditions Carry the Potential for
Evils Addressed by the Statute and Thus Should Be
Within Its Ambit
Just reframing the question in this way suggests a better
method for resolving the classification dilemma. Put simply, to try
to make the classification decision by asking if a provision is a cov-
erage clause, and thus immune, is to work backwards. In theory
the two categories of provisions-conditions subject to the statute
and immune coverage clauses-should be complementary, and it
should make no difference from which direction one approaches
the boundary line. In fact, however, for a few cases along the mar-
gin it can make a dramatic difference because, as we have seen,
"coverage clause" has no intrinsic analytic content. Instead, "cov-
erage clause" should be understood as a label for a residuary cate-
gory, a classification always to be defined in terms of what it is not.
109. See text accompanying notes 96 & 105 supra.
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That limited usage has a long history in several branches of insur-
ance law.n10 It should be preserved here, for a workable approach
to determining the statutory ambit must focus on whether the de-
fense to be classified poses the potential for evils of the kind which
prompted imposition of the statutory standard.
How does that help? It is a long leap from recognition that stat-
utes like section 44-358 were prompted by concerns about techni-
cal, immaterial failures of condition to a workable classification
criterion for determining which defenses should be subject to the
statutory standard. Indeed, as we have seen, post-loss conditions
often are triggered by technical, immaterial failures, yet the stat-
ute does not reach defenses based on such provisions."' Simi-
larly, some post-inception, pre-loss conditions can be triggered by
facts that do not materially prejudice the insurer, yet defenses
based on such provisions have not been subjected to the statute.
The answer lies in the contribute to the loss standard itself. Al-
though the statute appears to cover all failures of condition, the
standard it imposes supplies a workable discriminant only for de-
fenses predicated on policy conditions designed to protect the in-
surer against potential causes of loss. The contribute to the loss
standard does not fit post-loss notice conditions, for example, be-
cause a failure to give notice cannot possibly be one of those physi-
cal or moral hazards that might ripen into a causally relevant
contributor to a loss. Notice provisions try to control sources of
juridical risk with the potential to hamper insurer efforts to adjust
claims; they do not treat potential causes of loss. On that basis, the
Nebraska court in Clark12 concluded that the legislature did not
intend to subject post-loss failures of condition to the statutory
standard. On the same reasoning, section 44-358 should be inter-
preted to reach only post-inception, pre-loss defenses predicated
on policy provisions designed to treat physical and moral hazards,
for only such defenses provide a role for the contribute to the loss
standard to play. In this view, the'evil addressed by section 44-358
is both clear and narrow: policy provisions that seek to protect the
insurer against potential causes of loss with language framed so
110. See generally R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 6.6(b) (examining the traditional
rules immunizing "coverage clauses" from warranty statutes, incontestable
clauses, and doctrines of waiver and estoppel). See also Works, Coverage
Clauses and Incontestable Statutes: The Regulation of Post-Claim Underwrit-
ing, 1979 U. ILT. L.F. 809, 816: "Ptt simply, the term coverage clause defines a
null category; affixing that analytic label to policy language serves only to
grant the insurer immunity from the consequences that otherwise would flow
from characterizing it as something else."
111. See notes 39-76 & accompanying text'supra.
112. Clark v. State Farmers Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 483, 7 N.W.2d 71 (1942), discussed in
text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
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broadly that the condition can be breached by facts that do not
contribute to the loss.
Note that the classification inquiry required by section 44-358
has two elements. To fall within the statute, a policy condition
must (1) seek to control potential causes of insured events, and
(2) be so broadly framed that it could be triggered by facts which
did not contribute to the insured event. Thus, a provision in a live-
stock insurance policy that prohibits moving the insured horse to a
new location without prior permission of the insured clearly re-
flects insurer concern that new locations might be more hazardous,
yet it is possible to envision circumstances in which a violation of
that provision would not contribute to the loss of the insured
animal. The insurer has chosen to frame its protective measure in
language more sweeping than necessary to protect itself against
the risk that an unauthorized move might lead to an insured event.
If the insurer had provided that it would not be liable for losses
"resulting from" or "caused by" an unauthorized change in loca-
tion, the statute would have no application, because the policy con-
dition by its terms would guarantee that any violation of the
provision will have contributed to the loss. Such excepted cause
provisions properly are classed as "coverage clauses" beyond the
reach of the statute because they do not offer any role for the stat-
ute to play. However, the insurer might choose to protect itself
against potential causes of loss by using policy language that the
insured warrants not to move the livestock, or that baldly prohibits
changes in location, or that declares the policy "void" if the live-
stock is moved, or that suspends coverage "while" the livestock is
at other locations. From the insurer's perspective, this more
sweeping language is a legitimate way to avoid the greater juridical
risks and administrative difficulties associated with demonstrating
breach of a "caused by" clause; it is easier to show that the insured
horse was in an unauthorized location than to show that the unau-
thorized location was a cause of the loss. However, section 44-358
brands such tactics impermissible and converts such "potential
cause" provisions into "actual cause" provisions. That is the func-
tion of the statute, and it should be applied where it can function in
that way.
It is important to remember that the statute does not respond to
all instances of overly broad policy language, but only to overly
broad policy language in provisions designed to protect the insurer
from physical and moral hazards that might cause a loss. Once
again, location provisions in livestock policies permit a demonstra-
tion of how the classification inquiry should proceed. If the policy
condition declares that the insurer will be liable for certain losses
to livestock "while located" at a specified location, the provision
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might seem an apt candidate for application of the contribute to
the loss standard: we can imagine an unauthorized change in loca-
tion *vhich would not be a factor contributing to a loss to the in-
sured animals. However, that by itself is not enough. For the
statute to apply, the broadly framed language must appear in a pol-
icy condition aimed at controlling potential causes of insured
events. If the policy otherwise identifies the animals that are the
subject matter of the insurance, the "while located" condition
should be subject to the statute." 3 However, if the clause is "an
essential term in the identification of the goods covered,"" 4 as
where the "while located" language is the only means provided by
the policy to determine which portion of the insured's livestock is
being insured, then the provision does not involve the sort of over-
reaching addressed by the statute." 5 In the first usage, the only
justification for the broad language is the statutorily discredited
desire to avoid problems associated with demonstrating a causal
nexus between breach of a loss control provision and the insured
event. In the second usage, the broadly framed language is justi-
fied by its function: it identifies the subject matter of the insur-
ance. Failure to satisfy such a condition should not be subject to
the statute even though location in one place rather than another
may or may not be a factor which contributes to a loss. For such
provisions, the strict common law rule remains appropriate. Any
failure to satisfy a policy condition necessary to determine the
subject matter of the insurance should provide the insurer with a
defense.
"Evidentiary conditions" provide another example of broadly
couched policy conditions that remain beyond the reach of the
statute because they are not "potential cause" provisions. One fa-
miliar "evidentiary condition" is the provision in homeowners' pol-
icies limiting the insurer's liability for theft losses of personal
property from locked automobiles to those occasions where the au-
tomobile shows "visible marks of forcible entry upon the exte-
113. See Johnson v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 125 Neb. 759,251 N.W. 821 (1933); Hannah
v. American Live Stock Ins. Co., 111 Neb. 660, 197 N.W. 404 (1924); cf. Mayfleld
v. North River Ins. Co., 122 Neb. 63, 64-65, 239 N.W. 197, 197-99 (1931) (classify-
ing fire insurance policy condition limiting coverage to described property
"while located" at a specified place as within the statute on the ground that
the policy was the New York standard fire insurance policy and New York
courts had classified the provision as a warranty subject to the New York
statute).
114. E. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 296 (emphasis in original).
115. Id. at 296-99; R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 402-06. Cf. Peony Park, Inc., v. Secur-
ity Ins. Co., 137 Neb. 504,505,289 N.W. 848, 850 (1940) (enforcing without refer-
ence to the contribute to the loss statute a policy provision defining covered
contents "while contained in, on or attached to the building above
described").
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rior."1 6  It is not unusual to find this and similar evidentiary
conditions hiding in elaborate "definitions" of the insured event, 1 7
thus inviting the conclusion that they must be coverage defining
and therefore beyond the statutory ambit. In fact, they are not
necessary to identify the subject matter of the insurance. Rather,
their immunity stems from their peculiar function: they insist
upon a specific mode of proof that the loss was caused by a covered
peril. By their terms they prevent liability from attaching even
where alternative methods of demonstrating that the loss was
within the coverage assure that the failure of the evidentiary con-
dition will not prejudice the insurer. Moreover, they help the in-
surer avoid difficulties in demonstrating the actual cause of losses,
and thus reflect the same concerns that prompt insurers to use the
"potential cause" provisions that do trigger the statute. Nonethe-
less, evidentiary conditions are not subject to the contribute to the
loss standard. The lack of visible marks on the outside of a car
cannot contribute to a theft from that car, though that lack may or
may not prejudice the insurer. Such provisions do not seek to con-
trol potential causes of loss; they try to control potential difficulties
with demonstrating causes of loss. They should be deemed
116. This policy does not apply to loss away from the described premises
of.
(2) [P]roperty while unattended in or on any motor vehicle or
trailer, other than a public conveyance, unless the loss is the result of
forcible entry into such vehicle while all doors, windows or other
openings thereof are closed and locked, provided there are visible
marks of forcible entry upon the exterior of such vehicle or the loss is
the result of the theft of such vehicle which is not recovered within 30
days, but property shall not be considered unattended when the In-
sured is required to surrender the keys of such vehicle to a bailee
INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, SAMPLE INSURANCE POLICIES, PROPERTY
LIABILITY COvERAGES 12.
117. For example, the safe burglary policy construed in Hazuka v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 183 Neb. 336, 339, 160 N.W.2d 174, 177 (1968), contained the following
definition:
"Safe Burglary" means (1) the felonious abstraction of insured prop-
erty from within a vault or safe described in the declarations and lo-
cated within the premises by a person making felonious entry into
such vault or such safe and any vault containing the safe, when all
doors thereof are duly closed and locked by all combination locks
thereon, provided such entry shall be made by actual force and vio-
lence, of which force and violence there are visible marks made by
tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon the exterior of (a) all
of said doors of such vault or such safe and any vault containing the
safe, if entry is made through such doors, or (b) the top, bottom or
walls of such vault or such safe and any vault containing the safe
through which entry is made, if not made through such doors, or
(2) the felonious abstraction of such safe from within the premises.
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outside the statute, just as are post-loss conditions that also func-
tion to control juridical risks.
Of course, that evidentiary conditions are not subject to the
statute does not mean that the strict common law approach to fail-
ures of condition should be applicable. Like post-loss conditions
that also seek to control juridical hazards, evidentiary conditions
should be legislatively or judicially regulated to assure that they
will support a defense only when the insurer is actually
prejudiced. Courts in some jurisdictions have gone to extravagant
lengths to rationalize decisions curtailing the impact of evidentiary
conditions," 8 and a few commentators have urged that evidentiary
conditions be singled out for special judicial scrutiny." 9 In Ne-
braska, however, the court has evinced no readiness to join this
salutary trend. Many years ago, in Ware v. Home Mutual Insur-
ance Association,l2 0 the court opined in dicta that the contribute
to the loss standard should be applicable to an evidentiary condi-
tion in an automobile liability policy permitting transfer of cover-
age to a replacement automobile only upon approval by the
president of the insurer.1 21 Of course, the Ware dictum was wrong.
The provision did not involve a potential cause of loss and there-
118. Prime examples include: Strickland v. Gull Life Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 723, 242
S.E.2d 148 (1978) (branding as "unreasonable" and refusing to enforce a pro-
vision limiting recovery for "dismemberment by severence" to situations in
which the amputation occurs within 90 days of the injury); C & J Fertilizer,
Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (refusing to enforce a
"visible external marks" condition in a burglary policy on the grounds that it
violated the reasonable expectations of the insured, was unconscionable, and
failed to satisfy an implied warranty that the policy was fit for its intended
purpose); Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 189 Kan. 459, 370 P.2d 379
(1962) (refusing to enforce a "visible marks" condition on public policy
grounds). The Ferguson court was nothing if not creative:
We hold that where a rule of evidence is imposed by a provision in
an insurance policy,.., the assertion of such a rule by the insurance
carrier, beyond the reasonable requirements necessary to prevent
fraudulent claims against it in proof of the substantive conditions im-
posed by the policy, contravenes the public policy of this state.
Id. at 470-71, 370 P.2d at 387. See also Annot., 99 A.L.J2d 129 (1965); Annot.,
169 A.L.R. 224 (1947).
119. E.g., Holmes, Interpreting an Insurance Policy in Georgia: The Problem of the
Evidentiary Condition, 12 GA L. REv. 783 (1978); Slawson, New Approach to
Standard Forms, RL, July/Aug. 1972, at 49-50. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 Illustration 5 (1981) (apparently explaining
Ferguson and C & J Fertilizer, see note 118 supra, as the results of an inter-
pretation that "adequate evidence of force and violence to prevent fraudulent
claims" is all that is required to satisfy the condition).
120. 135 Neb. 329, 281 N.W. 617 (1938).
121. The court affirmed a judgment for the insured on the grounds that the record
permitted the jury to find that a local agent was cloaked with apparent au-
thority to waive the policy requirement and in fact did waive it. Id. at 334-35,
281 N.W. at 620.
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fore should not be within the statute despite the potential it posed
for a defense based on an immaterial and non-prejudicial failure of
condition. The Ware dictum has never been explicitly corrected,
but it was implicitly rejected in Christiansen v. Moore.122 There an
automobile policy extended coverage to a replacement automobile
if "the named Insured ... notifies the company within thirty
days." The trial court's determination that coverage did not ex-
tend to the replacement vehicle once the thirty day notice period
had run was affirmed despite the insured's demonstration that
"the change of vehicles . . .did not affect the risk."123 The in-
sured's brief argued that Ware authorized application of the con-
tribute to the loss standard,124 but the court's opinion did not
mention Ware. Unfortunately, the insured did not brief nor did the
court address whether a judicially imposed prejudice standard
might be appropriate for such evidentiary conditions.
In recent years the court has heard other evidentiary condition
cases, but the argument for imposing a prejudice standard has not
been squarely presented. Thus, in Cochran v. MFA Mutual Insur-
ance Co.,125 a "visible external marks" case, the court approved
use of the failure of condition defense without inquiry into
whether the failure had prejudiced the insurer. However, in
Cochran, the facts available to the insured were less than compel-
ling,12 6 and counsel for the insured understandably chose to con-
tend that the provision was unfairly surprising instead of arguing
that the insurer was not prejudiced by the breach. The closest the
court has come to confronting the challenge of evidentiary condi-
tions was Grace v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,127 where the insured sought to recover under the hit and run
provisions of her uninsured motorist coverage despite the lack of
'physical contact" between her vehicle and the one which forced
her from the road. The insurer stipulated that the insured's inju-
ries "were the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the
driver of the unidentified vehicle" but contended that it had no ob-
122. 184 Neb. 818, 172 N.W.2d 620 (1969).
123. Id. at 822-23, 172 N.W.2d at 622.
124. Brief of Appellant at 26-28, Christiansen v. Moore, 184 Neb. 818, 172 N.W.2d 620
(1969).
125. 201 Neb. 631, 271 N.W.2d 331 (1978) (noted in Note, "Visible Marks"Insurance
Exclusion Clauses, 59 NEB. L. REv. 214 (1980)).
126. Unlike the records available in the decisions cited in note 118, supra, the
Cochran record apparently provided little evidentiary basis for eliminating
the inference that the alleged theft was an "inside job," thus making difficult
the claim that the insurer's legitimate concerns were unprejudiced by the ab-
sence of visible external marks. For a useful elaboration of this view of the
Cochran decision, see Young, Insurance Policy Defenses: In Search of Re-
statements, 34 ARn. L REv. 507, 521-23 (1981).
127. 197 Neb. 118, 246 N.W.2d 874 (1976).
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ligation to indemnify the insured in the absence of "physical con-
tact." 28 The court agreed, rejecting the insured's argument that
the physical contact requirement constituted an impermissible re-
striction of the statutorily mandated uninsured motorist coverage.
Once again, the broader question of whether the insurer should be
permitted a defense where the failure of an evidentiary condition
did not prejudice the insurer was neither briefed nor discussed by
the court. 2 9
How does the classification method sketched here square with
the results actually reached in the Nebraska decisions? Quite well.
Understanding the focus of the contribute to the loss statute to be
overly broad "potential cause" provisions explains all but three of
the Nebraska Supreme Court's classification decisions.130 With
one exception, policy conditions classed as within the statute have
been "potential cause" provisions presenting the difficulties of
overbreadth which prompted the statute. All but two of the policy
conditions classed as beyond the statute either do not function to
control potential causes of loss or, if they do, are framed as
"caused by" or "resulting from" clauses which necessarily can be
triggered only by facts which have contributed to a loss. The Ne-
braska classification decisions that are inconsistent with this anal-
ysis are, quite simply, wrong.
The first of these erroneous classification decisions, Ware v.
Home Mutual Insurance Association,131 has been discussed.132
The court's indication that the evidentiary condition was subject to
128. Id. at 120, 246 N.W.2d at 875.
129. Justice Clinton dissented on the ground that the physical contact require-
ment defeats
the underlying purpose of the uninsured motorist statute .... "Hit-
and-run" is a colloquialism. When viewed in the light of the evident
legislative purpose, it refers not to physical contact, but rather to cau-
sation and to an operator whose identity is unknown because he fled
the scene....
It is surely doubtful that the Legislature, when enacting the unin-
sured motorist statute, was focusing on the literal meaning of the
word "hit." Rather it was concerned with affording "uninsured mo-
torist" coverage where an unidentified motorist caused the accident
and could not be found.
Id. at 124-25, 246 N.W.2d at 877-78. Justice Clinton's emphasis on whether the
facts satisfy the underlying purpose of the provision is consistent with a
"prejudice" inquiry, but of course it is legislative purpose, not insurer pur-
pose, that he deemed controlling. For a survey of the physical contact contro-
versy in other jurisdictions, see A. WMESS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE § 2.41 (1969).
130. Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610, 204
N.W.2d 162 (1973); Krause v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 844,5 N.W.2d
229 (1942); Ware v. Home Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 135 Neb. 329, 281 N.W. 617 (1938).
131. 135 Neb. 329, 281 N.W. 617 (1938).
132. See notes 120-24 & accompanying text supra.
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the statute was a casual aside in an opinion justifying the decision
on other grounds, and the force of that conclusion has been under-
cut by later judicial treatment of evidentiary condition defenses.
There is no reason to believe that the Ware dictum need prove a
continuing embarrassment to a classification criterion that insists
that the statute be applied only to policy conditions that seek to
control potential causes of loss.
The Omaha Sky Diversi33 classification of the medical certifi-
cate defense as a coverage defense beyond the statute also must
be adjudged incorrect. The certification requirement seems
designed to protect the insurer against risks posed by pilots with
medical problems, and it is drawn so broadly that it purports to
provide a defense even when the pilot's lack of certificate had
nothing to do with medical deficiencies and even when the loss
would have occurred whether or not the pilot was properly certifi-
cated. It thus is precisely the sort of provision that should be
within the statute. Unfortunately, the Sky Divers court un-
characteristically allowed the function of the provision to be
clouded by the form of its expression, so that the condition was
permitted to masquerade as part of the definition of the insured
event. As we have seen, that approach proves a slippery slope be-
reft of stopping points: all conditions precedent logically can be
collapsed into a single giant statement of the insured event. The
certification provision did not function to identify the subject mat-
ter of the insurance; it did function to control a potential cause of
loss to the plane. The Sky Divers' preoccupation with form should
be recognized as a temporary lapse from the court's usual and ap-
propriate attention to the function of provisions being classified.
The Sky Divers result should be recognized for what it is:
incorrect.
Krause v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.'3 is the third erro-
neous classification decision. There, an accident insurance policy
contained the following provision:
This policy does not cover loss resulting directly or indirectly, in whole or
in part from... (D) bodily injury sustained by the insured while in or on
any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation... unless the in-
sured is actually riding as a fare paying passenger in a licensed commer-
cial aircraft provided by an incorporated common carrier for passenger
service, and while such aircraft is operated by a licensed transport pilot
and isfing in a regular civil airway between definite established airports
The insured used a "trip pass" to book passage on a licensed air-
133. Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610, 204
N.W.2d 162 (1973). See notes 77-84 & accompanying text supra.
134. 141 Neb. 844, 5 N.W.2d 229 (1942).
135. Id. at 846, 5 N.W.2d at 231.
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craft and died when the plane crashed; the insured satisfied all the
policy conditions except the requirement that he be a "fare paying
passenger." Should this failure of condition defense be subject to
the contribute to the loss standard? The Nebraska Supreme Court
said no. "What we have here is not a forfeiture of a policy upon
conditions broken, but an excepted risk never assumed by the in-
surer."13 6 The court's attempted distinction fails, of course, for the
statute has been and should be held applicable to many failures of
condition that do not result in forfeiture. What is less clear is
whether the classification approach recommended here demands a
different result.
At first glance, the provision seems to have two claims to im-
mune status. First, it may not be obvious that the provision seeks
to control potential causes of loss. How can paying or not paying a
fare ever be a causally relevant factor contributing to an accidental
death? Second, the provision speaks to losses "resulting from"
certain activities; it thus might appear to pose no overbreadth
problems. Nevertheless, the provision belongs within the statute.
The ascription of function for the provision may be more difficult in
Krause than in Sky Divers, but the requirement that the accident
victim be a fare paying passenger should be understood to be an
attempt to limit air risks assumed by the insurer to a narrow range
of risks associated with passengers on scheduled flights on estab-
lished carriers. That the insurer's way of framing its protective
measures may only crudely identify the true object of its concern
should not force us to hypothesize some other function for the pro-
vision; this is not an instance where the provision operates to dis-
tinguish a coverage marketed in one policy from that marketed in
another. It is aimed at potential causes of loss, and is just the sort
of unfocused, overly broad policy condition that prompted legisla-
tive concern in the first place. Moreover, that the provision em-
ploys "resulting from" language does not immunize it from the
statute. The provision is not triggered by a loss resulting from a
lack of fare paying status; instead the provision applies to "loss re-
sulting... from bodily injury ... while in [an aircraft]... unless
the insured is, . . a fare paying passenger .... ,"137 Despite first
appearances, the provision is a "while" clause designed to control
the risks associated with unusual air travel arrangements. It can
be triggered by facts that do not contribute to the loss and thus
should have been classed as within the statute.
Fortunately, the process of ascribing functions to particular pol-
icy provisions rarely will be as difficult as it was in Krause. Most
policy conditions will yield rather easily to a classification inquiry
136. Id. at 850, 5 N.W.2d at 232.
137. Id. at 846, 5 N.W.2d at 231 (emphasis added).
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that asks whether the provision tries to protect the insurer against
potential causes of loss with language framed so broadly that the
condition can be breached by facts that do not contribute to the
loss. Of course, there will be exceptions, but even where the clas-
sification method prescribed here does not produce easy answers,
it is still to be preferred to the alternatives. It is grounded in the
language and the historic role of the statute, and it responds to
substance rather than form. It thus supplies a workable solution
to the persistent problem of determining which policy defenses are
subject to the contribute to the loss statute.
I. WHEN DOES A FAILURE OF CONDITION CONTRIBUTE
TO A LOSS?
Whether a failure of condition subject to section 44-358 contrib-
uted to the loss ordinarily is a question that will pose no special
difficulties. The question is one of cause-in-fact,13 8 not "proxi-
mate," "legal," or "direct" cause,139 and here instinctual ascriptions
138. See, e.g., Slafter v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 209, 217, 5 N.W.2d
217, 221 (1942) (the issue is whether the breach "in any manner contributed
to the loss") (emphasis added); Mayfield v. North River Ins. Co., 122 Neb. 63,
69, 239 N.W. 197, 199 (1931) (quoting from Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Norfolk
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 14 F.2d 524, 527 (8th Cir. 1926)) (the issue is whether the
breach "'contributed in any way to the loss' ") (emphasis added).
139. Of course, many insurance decisions do involve an effort to identify the "di-
rect," "sole," or "active" cause of a loss that may be said to have multiple
causes, and thus pose issues quite different from those presented by the con-
tribute to the loss statute. One excellent recent example is Lydick v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 187 Neb. 97, 187 N.W.2d 602 (1971), in which the court
affirmed summary judgment for the insurer on the ground that death of wind-
driven cattle who fell through ice on a pond was not a "direct loss by wind-
storm" within the policy:
The immediate and direct cause of the loss in this case was the
collapse of the ice on which the cattle stood. The cold wind, by maxi-
mum inference, merely created an antecedent and preliminary con-
dition which contributed to their wandering upon the snow-covered
ice, and thus can only be considered as an indirect cause.
Id. at 100,187 N.W.2d at 604. See also Long v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 145 Neb. 623,
635, 17 N.W.2d 675, 682 (1945):
We think the correct rule is: An accident insurance policy, provid-
ing for the payment of stipulated sums for accidental injury or death
of the assured, where such injury or death is "from violent and acci-
dental means alone, resulting directly, independently and exclu-
sively of all other causes" and also providing that 'Ihere shall be no
liability whatever unless death or disability results wholly from the
injury, nor where any disease, defect or bodily infirmity is a contrib-
uting cause of death or injury," means that recovery may be had
when the accident is the active, efficient and precipitating cause
which set in motion the agencies which resulted in the injury or
death without the intervention of any other independent force, even
though existing infirmities of the insured may be necessary condi-
tions to the result.
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of causation often serve well enough. For example, in Sanks v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,140 a policy condition required
the insured to use due care to protect damaged insured property
from theft. The insured truck trailer was damaged in a highway
accident in Chicago, the insured left it in a roadside ditch for a
week, and it was stolen. Under these circumstances it is easy to
accept the court's conclusion that, as a matter of law, the failure of
condition contributed to the loss.141 If pressed to explain our per-
ception that a causal nexus was present, we might say that if the
insured had complied with the condition by using due care to pro-
tect the trailer, this theft would not have occurred.
Such common sense application of "but for" concepts of causa-
tion also explain some decisions in which a breach of condition
was said not to have contributed to the loss. Thus, where a policy
provision prohibited other insurance on the insured property but
other insurance nonetheless was procured, the policyholder
clearly was in breach of the condition, and the breach may well
have enhanced the moral hazard to which the insurer.was ex-
posed.142 Nevertheless, absent a demonstration that the additional
insurance induced the insured to commit arson, 43 it is difficult to
see how the breach of condition could be said to have contributed
to the loss. Our conclusion that the breach did not contribute to
140. 131 Neb. 266, 267 N.W. 454 (1936).
141. Id. at 273, 267 N.W. at 458.
142. See, e.g., Slafter v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 209, 5 N.W.2d 217
(1942); Newman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 122 Neb. 94, 239 N.W. 464
(1931).
143. See Quisenberry v. National Fire Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 793, 797, 273 N.W. 197, 199
(1937): "It may be that in reference to the other insurance... the only man-
ner by which defendant could prove that said breach contributed to the loss
would be to show that plaintiff... secured the policy in question, caused the
fire and thereby defrauded the defendant ......
Some other jurisdictions with contribute to the loss statutes have been
reluctant to apply the standard to defenses predicated on policy provisions
designed to control moral hazards. See generally E. PATn'ERsON, supra note 1,
at 359-60.
In Kansas, the debate concerning whether the contribute to the loss stan-
dard could be applied to "moral hazard" provisions has demonstrated re-
markable staying power. In Becker v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co., 105 Kan. 99, 181
P. 549 (1919), the Kansas court declared that the statute was inapplicable
where the facts misrepresented or fraudulently concealed are such
as increase the moral risk .... Misrepresentations of this character,
although they do not directly contribute to the contingency of death,
are deemed not to be within the purpose of the statute. Such misrep-
resentations never can contribute to the contingency insured against,
and therefore it is held that the statute does not apply to or render
them harmless.
Id. at 102, 181 P. at 551. That rule reigned in Kansas until 1954, when the Kan-
sas court expressly reversed its position. Hawkins v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
176 Kan, 24, 269 P.2d 389 (1954).
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the loss rests on our perception that the loss would have occurred
even had there been no breach of condition.
Unfortunately, not all contribute to the loss questions yield so
easily to simple intuitive ascriptions of causation. Consider for ex-
ample, these questions:
Case 1: A livestock insurance policy includes a prohibition
against moving specified insured stock from a designated pasture
without prior permission of the insurer. An insured horse is
moved two and one half miles to another pasture without permis-
sion and, while there, is struck by lightning and killed. Did the
failure of condition contribute to the loss?144
Case 2: An aircraft hull insurance policy includes a prohibi-
tion against allowing the plane to be piloted by any person who
lacks prescribed licenses and certificates. While the plane is being
flown by a person who lacks a required certificate, a wheel col-
lapses and the hull is damaged. Did the failure of condition con-
tribute to the loss?145
Case 3: A property insurance policy on a building includes a
prohibition against storing combustibles in the insured building.
The insured engages in extensive fireproofing improvements to the
building, and begins to store combustibles in the building. The
building is destroyed by fire which starts spontaneously among the
combustible materials. Did the failure of condition contribute to
the loss? 46
Here, the simple "but for" formulation functions less well. Stu-
dents, when presented with these cases, sometimes respond by de-
manding more facts. Was the adjacent pasture more or less
exposed to the lightning hazard? Why was the pilot unlicensed?
Could a qualified pilot have prevented the collapse of the wheel?
Did the uncertificated pilot take over the controls during a
scheduled flight with a licensed pilot or did the uncertificated pilot
initiate the flight? Taking into account both the fireproofing and
the presence of combustibles, was the insured building more or
144. The facts of Case 1 are drawn from Johnson v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 125 Neb.
759,251 N.W. 821 (1933). The court, without discussion, held that the failure of
condition contributed to the loss. The "conception of cause" underlying that
result, Patterson sniffed, was "the primitive one, but-for cause" which
"[o]rdinarily, it is believed.., is not sufficient to show that something con-
tributed to the loss." E. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 359.
145. The facts of Case 2 are drawn from Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v.
Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610, 204 N.W.2d 162 (1973). The court held the stat-
ute inapplicable, and thus did not reach the causation question. See notes 77-
81 & accompanying text supra.
146. The facts of Case 3 are drawn from a hypothetical posed by Professor Keeton.
R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 387. Professor Keeton was addressing the dan-
gers of "net risk" arguments and did not reach the causation question.
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less subject to the fire hazard than it had been before these dam-
ages? Was the fireproofing undertaken because storing combus-
tibles was contemplated, or were the two changes "independent"?
At first look, this concern to establish more fully "what hap-
pened" is an expected concomitant of a contribute to the loss stan-
dard that subjects insurers to the added burdens of discovering
and proving a causal nexus between the breach of condition and
the loss.147 On further reflection, however, such questions may
seem irrelevant. It was a breach of condition to move the horse to
a different pasture, and but for the move the death by lightning
would not have occurred. How can it further the causal inquiry to
determine whether the move increased the risk of being struck by
lightning? The statute does not explicitly require that the breach
of condition both enhance the risk and contribute to the loss. It is
a commonplace that a breach of condition can materially enhance
the risk to the insurer yet not contribute to the loss. Can the con-
verse also be true? Can an insurer successfully mount a breach of
condition defense under a supposedly more restrictive contribute
to the loss standard on facts that would not permit a defense under
a materiality standard? Should a trier of fact be permitted to de-
termine that moving the horse to a different pasture did not con-
tribute to the loss because the move did not enhance the risk that
the horse would be hit by lightning? Or is the possibility that a
breach of condition may contribute to a loss without having en-
hanced the risk .of that loss merely another anomaly that demon-
strates the essential absurdity of the contribute to the loss
standard?
These questions may best be approached by asking exactly
what we mean when we concur with the court's conclusion in
Sanks that leaving the damaged trailer untended for a week in a
Chicago ditch contributed to its loss by theft. We may dismiss at
once some of the more formal meanings sometimes accorded
causal statements. Clearly we do not mean that leaving the prop-
erty in the ditch was a necessary condition of it being stolen; any
number of other scenarios could have resulted in the theft of the
trailer. Of course, also, we do not mean that leaving the trailer in
the ditch was a sufficient condition for its theft; if the trailer had
been left in the ditch, but no thief had found it, then no loss by
theft would have occurred. Thus, leaving the trailer in the ditch
was neither necessary nor sufficient for its theft. Rather, leaving
the trailer in the ditch was but one of a complex of conditions
which together were sufficient for the theft of the property. The
condition of being in the ditch.was a necessary part of this complex
147. See notes 11-17 & accompanying text supra.
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of conditions; if the property had not been left in the ditch, the re-
mainder of this complex of conditions would not have produced a
stolen trailer. According to the formulation favored by some stu-
dents of causal ascriptions, being in the ditch was an insufficient
but necessary part of a complex of conditions which were them-
selves unnecessary but sufficient to result in the theft of the
trailer. 4 8
How does this venture into scholasticism help us to resolve the
three cases posed? By reminding us that conventional "but for"
explanations of causal judgments only partially describe the deci-
sion processes underlying those judgments. For many results
there are any number of circumstances "but for" which the result
would not have occurred. Yet we must resist the natural tendency
to acquiesce in "the view that everything which is a sine qua non
or necessary condition of some event has an equal right to be
treated as the cause of that event."149 The point is not just that
events may have multiple causes of greater or lesser significance;
some conditions sine qua non of a result do not deserve to be con-
sidered even one among several causes of that result. Imagine that
the trailer stolen in Sanks was painted in day-glo blue. Being
painted blue might be characterized as an insufficient but neces-
sary part of the complex of conditions that were themselves unnec-
essary but sufficient to produce the theft of this blue trailer from
this Chicago ditch. Of course, that seems the emptiest of charac-
terizations, as indeed it is. We shrink from concluding that its blue
color contributed to the theft of the trailer because intuitively we
indulge and apply a distinction between mere conditions sine qua
non and those conditions sine qua non that are causally relevant.
Some circumstances attending the theft of the trailer were only
incidentally connected with its loss. They only "specify further, or
individuate"150 what happened. To use a formulation often em-
ployed to make the same distinction in another branch of the law,
being blue was "'merely an attendant circumstance,' " not" 'an ef-
fective and contributing cause.' "151
148. For a formal presentation of the kind of argument rehearsed here, see Mack-
ie, Causes & Conditions, in CAUSATION AND CONDIONALS 15 (E. Sosa ed.
1975).
149. H. HART & A. HONORP, CAUSATION iN THE LAW 19 n.1 (1959). The authors criti-
cize the tendency of legal discussions of causation to assume "that, as far as
the facts go, any event, however remote in the past, 'but for' which, a given
event would not have happened, is as much the cause of the later event as
any other." Id.
150. Id. at 110. For a fuller statement of this point, with many useful examples,
see id. at 108-16.
151. Dean v. Leonard, 323 Mass. 606, 607, 83 N.E.2d 443, 444 (1949) (quoting the trial
court).
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But upon what does this distinction turn? Which conditions of
a result were only attendant circumstances, and which were caus-
ally significant? Hart and Honort have done better than most in
grappling with this question. To them, the intuitive judgment that
being blue did not contribute to the loss in any causally relevant
way rests upon a "common sense" model of causation: "[A] cause
must be a necessary element in some set of conditions connected
generally with an outcome of this sort, and not merely connected
with this particular outcome as a feature happening to character-
ize the particular action ... .,"152 Again, the test is one of general
connection; there is causation if the sequence of events "exempli-
fies general connexions between kinds of events, statable in broad
generalizations, holding good for other instances at other times
and places."15 3 In other words, the question is one of materiality:
would the fact be generally perceived as enhancing the risk that
the feared result will occur? Leaving a trailer untended in a Chi-
cago ditch satisfies the requirement of a general connection; it
seems likely to increase the risk of theft. Painting a trailer blue
exhibits no such general enhancement of the risk of theft and thus
is unlikely to be a causally relevant factor. On the other hand, sub-
jecting insured property to other insurance increases the moral
hazard and the risk that an arson fire will damage the property, but
the moral hazard usually does not enhance the risk of other fire
losses. Thus, breach of an "other insurance" condition usually is
not a causally relevant factor in a non-arson fire loss. The critical
point is that ascribing causal significance to a breach of a policy
condition ultimately requires an attribution of purpose for the pol-
icy condition. 5 4 We need to determine what risk the condition
was designed to ameliorate if we are to be able to say whether a
breach of that condition contributed to the loss.
Thus, one should not dismiss too quickly demands for more
facts to aid in resolving the cases posed. Such questions do not
necessarily misapprehend the nature of the contribute to the loss
standard, nor should their force be thought to depend on the sup-
posed anomaly that on a particular state of facts an insurer might
have a defense in a contribute to the loss state but not in a materi-
ality state. Instead, some such'questions reflect concerns that go
to the core of the process of making causal ascriptions. To con-
clude that a failure to satisfy an insurance policy condition was a
causally relevant factor in producing an insured loss, one must
152. H. HART & A. HONORI, supra note 149, at 132.
153. Id. at 114.
154. See generally Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L REv. 60, 66
(1956) (arguing that causal pronouncements necessarily are "pregnant with a
purposive quality").
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first determine that, generally speaking, such failures of condition
do enhance the risk of a loss of that sort. In a materiality state the
inquiry could end there. In Nebraska, however, the contribute to
the loss standard prescribes a second step. Did the risk that was
enhanced by the breach of condition come to fruition? In Sanks, it
did. In the "other insurance" cases, where the risk that provokes
the prohibition is the risk of reduced incentives to prevent fire
losses, it did not.
The more difficult cases posed above also yield to this analysis.
In Case 1, if moving the horse to the second pasture enhanced the
risk of death by lightning, then the insurer should have a defense
because that enhanced risk came to fruition in the death of the
horse. However, if moving the horse to a lowland pasture reduced
the potential for lightning-caused deaths, that the horse nonethe-
less was hit by lightning should not mean that the breach of condi-
tion contributed to the loss. Those more comfortable with
interpretivist approaches might rationalize this result with the
technique employed by the Nebraska court in dealing with the no-
tice condition defense in Meckna:155 the purpose of the policy con-
dition was to protect the insurer from the increased risk of loss
that some changes in location pose; this change in location did not
involve such an enhancement of the risk. therefore the purposes of
the condition and thus the condition itself were not breached! A
more straightforward rationale acknowledges that the policy con-
dition was breached by moving the horse to an unauthorized loca-
tion, but denies that the breach contributed to the loss where the
death seems coincidental rather than an outcome of a sequence of
events which in common experience exemplifies some more gener-
alized connection between the conduct complained of and out-
comes of this sort.156
Note that under this analysis it does not aid the insurer to
demonstrate that the move to the unauthorized pasture enhanced
the risk of loss by flood, unless that enhanced risk was the one
which came to fruition. Nor does it aid the insurer to demonstrate
that changes of location often enhance the risk posed to the in-
surer. The issue is not whether the policy provision is material-
we may concede that it is-but whether the particular breach of
that condition was material.
In Case 2, the dependence on marshalling facts is equally evi-
dent. If the plane originally was piloted by a fully licensed and
certificated pilot, so that the breach of condition occurred when an
uncertificated pilot took the controls during a flight that would
155. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meckna, 180 Neb. 516, 144 N.W.2d 73 (1966). See notes 59-
61 & accompanying text supra.
156. H. HART & A. HONORt, supra note 149, at 115.
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have occurred anyway, the argument is quite simple. Turning the
controls over to the uncertificated pilot did or did not enhance the
risk to the insurer, depending upon the actual skill levels of the
pilot. If the risk was materially enhanced because he was un-
skilled, then the question becomes whether that risk-lack of
skill--came to fruition. Did he carelessly drive into a mountain?
Did his landing put unnecessary stress on the wheel carriage?
These are the sorts of questions that must be answered if the nec-
essary causal nexus between material lack of skill and the prop-
erty damage is to be made out.
However, if the plane took off with an unlicensed pilot in a flight
that otherwise would not have occurred, then the analysis might
seem to change. On these facts, so the argument goes, it does not
matter whether the pilot was skilled or unskilled, because the risk
to the insurer was enhanced by the very fact that the plane was in
the air rather than safely tucked away in a hangar. The unlicensed
pilot's act of flying without a license enhanced the risk to the in-
surer, and that risk came to fruition when the plane was damaged
as a result of an incident occurring during the flight. Therefore, the
breach of condition contributed to the insured loss.
Although this argument can claim some surface plausibility, it
is fundamentally flawed because it does not select an appropriate
definition of the breach of condition for which causal significance
is claimed. The risk against which the insurer sought. to protect
itself by the policy language was the risk of unqualified pilots, not
the risk of extra flights. There is no reason to treat all the facts
involved in the breach of condition as a single "indivisible com-
plex" of conditions sine qua non: making-a-flight-which-otherwise-
would-not-have-occurred-without-a-required-certificate. The focus
should be narrower, on whether the lack of a certificate enhanced a
risk which then came to fruition.
Case 3 demonstrates that this analysis also can cut in favor of
the insurer. There the insured might argue that storing combus-
tibles did not contribute to the loss because there was no net in-
crease in the risk when other risk ameliorative measures are taken
into account. Should that argument be persuasive? It depends. If
the argument is that other unrelated changes offset the increase in
risk created by the breach of condition, the insurer should prevail,
for the insured's argument depends on the artifice of an improp-
erly identified breach of condition. 57 On the other hand, if storing
157. The policy provision invoked by the insurer reflects a specific insurer con-
cern-storage of combustibles. The contribute to the loss statute insists that
a breach of that provision be a causally relevant factor in producing a loss,
but it does not convert the policy provision into a prohibition of net increases
of risk during the policy term.
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the combustibles did not materially enhance the risk, because the
protective measures were so well done, then the insured should
prevail.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska contribute to the loss statute is not a universal
solvent for the problems of insureds who have failed to satisfy in-
surance policy conditions. Pre-inception and post-loss failures of
condition are beyond the statute's reach, as are post-inception,
pre-loss failures to satisfy coverage-defining policy conditions.
However, a defense predicated on a policy condition designed to
protect the insurer against a potential cause of loss should be
deemed subject to the statutory standard, thus placing on the in-
surer the burden of demonstrating that the failure of condition in-
creased the risk that an insured event would occur, and that the
increased risk actually came to fruition in an insured loss.
